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Selectorate theory and the democratic peacekeeping hypothesis: evidence from Fiji and Bangladesh

Jamie Levin, Joseph Mackay and Abouzar Nasirzadeh

ABSTRACT
UN peacekeeping has undergone two major shifts since the end of the cold war. The first is a move away from limited efforts to maintain peace in post-conflict environments towards more robust efforts at peace enforcement. Second, the composition of peacekeepers has changed. In 1990, the leading contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions were notable supporters of multilateral cooperation and other liberal-democratic norms with extensive peacekeeping experience. As of 2012, however, the top contributors to UN peacekeeping missions had changed dramatically: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Nigeria have replaced traditional peacekeepers Canada, Finland, Austria and Norway. While liberal-democratic nations continue to bear most of the costs, they have all but disappeared on the ground, leading to a precipitous decline in the quality of peacekeeping. The consequences of the latter shift are the subject of considerable debate. Some argue that peacekeeping facilitates the transmission of democratic norms and institutions to sending states. Others increasingly argue that the so-called 'democratic peacekeeping' hypothesis is a 'myth'. We go further, suggesting that autocratic states may take on peacekeeping duties as a way of maintaining costly security apparatuses for the purposes of domestic repression. Peacekeeping – a feature of liberal post-cold war global governance – risks becoming a means to facilitate illiberal domestic governance in the developing world. We demonstrate this in two tentative but cautionary cases: Fiji and Bangladesh.

Introduction

Since the end of the cold war, peacekeeping has undergone two major shifts. First, the size and scope of peacekeeping has increased. Where peacekeeping missions once largely monitored ceasefires along clearly demarcated boundaries, they have since been broadened to include direct interventions in ongoing civil conflicts. As a result, today there are more peacekeeping missions, which are typically much larger, more expensive and bloodier than those of the cold war era. Second, the composition of peacekeepers has changed. In 1990, the leading contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions were notable supporters of multilateral cooperation and other

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liberal-democratic norms with extensive peacekeeping experience. As of 2012, however, the top contributors to UN peacekeeping missions had changed dramatically. Peacekeepers once largely drawn the ranks of Western militaries have increasingly been replaced by blue helmets from the developing world, among them numerous autocratic and transitioning democracies. Where top troop contributing countries once included Canada, Finland, Austria and Norway, they have today largely been supplanted by Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Nigeria. States from the Global South have all but replaced developed states as peacekeepers in a tacit bargain in which developing world blood is paid for with developed world treasure. This article explores the consequences of this latter shift.

Most notably, in the two decades following the end of the cold war numerous concerns have been raised about the quality of peacekeeping.[1] Peacekeepers drawn from the developing world have often been poorly trained and underequipped, making them ill suited for the more technically complex missions characteristic of the post-cold war era. Furthermore, troubling accusations of misconduct have regularly been levelled against peacekeeping forces. These concerns have prompted efforts to investigate and reform peacekeeping practices. An additional consequence of the shift in the composition of peacekeepers – the impact of peacekeeping on the peacekeeping nations themselves – has recently become the subject of considerable debate. Some argue that peacekeeping facilitates the transmission of democratic norms and institutions to sending states.[2] Increasingly, however, others argue that the so-called 'democratic peacekeeping' hypothesis is a 'myth'.[3]

In this article, we aim to explore further the meso-level factors that shape the putative anti-democratic influence of peacekeeping on contributing countries. We argue that peacekeeping risks increasing domestic repression among the new class of peacekeepers. The West provides substantial resources to developing troop contributors, including money, material and training, in exchange for peacekeeping. Such support for peacekeeping is often channelled directly to militaries, rather than into general government coffers. This likely generates increased political autonomy in the military, and may embolden militaries to interfere in their own countries' domestic politics.

We aim to develop a theoretical explanation, using 'selectorate theory': a framework based on the domestic political constraints faced by domestic elites.[4] Briefly, selectorate theory stipulates that all leaders are accountable to a domestic population ('selectorate') that permits their rule, a subset of whom (a 'willing coalition') supports them. In democracies, the selectorate is the electorate, while in autocracies the selectorate comprises a smaller population of government-linked elites. In either instance, changes in the political capacity of the military may imbalance the winning coalition, increasing the risk of a coup or, where the military is already in power, entrenching military rule. Importantly, we claim that foreign aid provided for peacekeeping is

neither necessary nor sufficient on its own to entrench military rule or increase the risk of coups. Rather, it likely operates as an intervening variable or contributing cause, making coups, abuses and other anti-democratic malfeasance more likely.[5]

On this basis, we advance two claims. First, democratic governments will be at increased risk of overthrow in military coups. Militaries strengthened by externally provided resources will be less accountable to their civilian governments, and will be empowered in a way that disrupts the existing winning coalition. Second, existing military governments may become more entrenched. Where military elites have already seized power, externally granted military resources will entrench their rule, making a return to democracy more difficult.

In this article, we offer an initial case-based test of the two hypotheses. In so doing, we conduct a 'plausibility probe': '*Plausibility probes* are preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted.'[6] Because the hypothesis is somewhat complex, with multiple variables or moving parts, we offer a first-cut, exploratory study of a relatively ambitious claim: initial and promising evidence of the theory, which we will conclude justifies further inquiry. Methodologically, the cases are concomitantly exploratory. Because we are concerned with plausibility, we document basic facts and look for connections, qualitatively exploring likely causal relationships.

We explore two cases of support for peacekeeping on a developing troop contributing state. We show that Fiji has grown a costly security apparatus with the aid of Western funding supplied in exchange for peacekeeping duties. Fiji, a country that faces few international or domestic threats, now maintains both a quality and quantity of armed forces that would otherwise be unaffordable. At more than 1 soldier for every 100 citizens it has become one of the most heavily militarized countries on the planet. It has increasingly used these troops for the purposes of domestic repression. Where the army was once a small force with little institutional clout or material power, it now has both the means and the desire to intervene in domestic politics. Indeed, it has prosecuted no less than 4 coups in the last 20 years.

Our second case, Bangladesh, has undergone a rapid process of military modernization and professionalization, aided by international donors. At the same time, Bangladesh has suffered numerous coups. However, the large population and outsized military in Bangladesh preclude us from drawing robust conclusions about the impact that peacekeeping has had. Nonetheless, we do note that it likely constituted a permissive condition for Bangladeshi political outcomes. Despite threatening to cut it off, the UN has increasingly come to rely on Bangladesh for peacekeeping. Indeed, Bangladesh has grown to be the world's largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. While the Bangladeshi experience is less drastic than that of Fiji, we show it to be consistent with our theory.

This article proceeds as follows. First, we review the history of post-cold war shifts in peacekeeping, showing how the balance of troop contributions has shifted from developed democracies to developing non-democracies. Second, in two sections, we show how democratic and non-democratic institutions present leaders with differing incentives, in the context of deploying troops to increasingly violence peacekeeping operations. Third, we consider two cases of troop contributing countries, finding evidence consistent with anti-democratic consequences.

The causes and consequences of second generation peacekeeping

The conclusion of the cold war marked a significant change in the composition and conduct of peacekeeping.[7] The break-up of the Soviet Union and attendant decline of military aid to developing states led to an unprecedented number of state failures. At the same time, old cold war rivalries no longer presented a challenge to resolving long-running civil wars. UN Security Council deadlock was no longer inevitable. The net result was a significant increase in civil and secessionist conflicts, and, concomitantly, increased demand for peacekeeping. No longer hamstrung by cold war rivalries, the UN was free to take wider actions necessary to ensure peace and security under the provisions of its charter.[8] Figure 1 shows the spike in the number of uniformed personnel after the conclusion of the cold war. In 1992, over 50,000 peacekeepers were deployed worldwide: almost five times 1990 levels. The numbers went back to historic levels in the late 1990s, only to return to record levels again between 2000 and 2010. The global cost of maintaining blue berets also peaked after the cold war. Currently there are 124,000 active personnel involved in 15 peacekeeping missions with an annual budget of US$7.4 billion, under UN auspices.[9]

As well as becoming larger and costlier during this period, peacekeeping also became bloodier. Where cold war peacekeepers were largely neutral and sometimes even unarmed,[10] in the post cold war era UN peacekeepers were expected to intervene forcibly, often between unwilling combatants within shattered countries where defined boundaries between belligerents did not exist (c.f. Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda and others). Furthermore, where previous peacekeeping missions had mostly been limited to enforcing ceasefires along clearly demarcated frontiers and operated on the consent of the parties, these missions, which came to be known as second generation peacekeeping, often required that peace be imposed on unwilling combatants while fighting continued to rage.[11] More missions necessarily meant more troops on the ground in more places. A more active peacekeeping force necessarily implied more

Figure 1. Peacekeepers
Source: All data from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/ (accessed 23 May 2015).

casualties. Figure 2 shows peacekeeper fatalities, which peaked during this time and have remained consistently higher than pre-cold war levels ever since.

The composition of peacekeeping forces has shifted as well. Table 1 shows the top ten contributors by personnel to UN peacekeeping missions since 1990. In 1990, the top contributors of blue berets were: Canada, Finland, Austria and Norway, all liberal democracies committed to human rights, international cooperation, multilateralism and pro-normative behaviour in


Figure 2. Fatalities among peacekeepers
Source: All data from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/ (accessed 23 May 2015).

Table 1. Personnel contributions to UN Peacekeeping mission by nation

30 Nov. 1990	31 Mar. 1995	31 Mar. 2000	31 Mar. 2005	31 Mar. 2010	31 Mar. 2015
Canada (1,002)	France (4,962)	Nigeria (3,183)	Pakistan (9,338)	Pakistan (9,781)	Bangladesh (9,516)
Finland (992)	UK (3,874)	India (2,272)	Bangladesh (7,787)	Bangladesh (9,159)	Pakistan (8,349)
Austria (967)	Pakistan (3,853)	Australia (1,638)	India (5,649)	India (7,971)	India (8,121)
Norway (924)	Jordan (3,385)	Ghana (1,430)	Ethiopia (3,399)	Egypt (5,077)	Ethiopia (7,862)
Ghana (892)	USA (3,253)	Bangladesh (1,356)	Ghana (3,143)	Nigeria (4,900)	Nepal (5,244)
Nepal (851)	Bangladesh (2,908)	Kenya (1,065)	Nepal (2,869)	Nepal (4,197)	Rwanda (5,709)
Ireland (839)	Canada (2,899)	Poland (989)	Nigeria (2,730)	Rwanda (3,484)	Senegal (3,316)
UK (769)	Poland (2,013)	Thailand (909)	Uruguay (2,534)	Ghana (3,406)	Ghana (3,023)
Sweden (720)	Nepal (1,977)	Fiji (785)	South Africa (2,306)	Uruguay (2,446)	Nigeria (2,980)
Fiji (719)	Netherlands (1,819)	Guinea (785)	Jordan (1,994)	Ethiopia (2,379)	Egypt (2,904)

Source: All data from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/ (accessed 23 May 2015).

the international system.[12] Since the conclusion of the cold war, however, these countries have disappeared from the list of major peacekeeping nations, to be replaced by developing countries, many of which have poor human rights records and little previous experience with peacekeeping.[13]

While exceptions persist – for example, French contributions to West African peacekeeping, and Australian and New Zealand deployments in Timor-Leste – in brute terms, peacekeepers are now drawn disproportionately not from developed democracies, but rather from developing non-democracies. Though they still pick up the tab for peacekeeping (see Table 2), today 'no developed country currently contributes troops to the most difficult United Nations-led peacekeeping operations from a security perspective' according to the UN.[14]

Democracy and peacekeeping

As peacekeeping became bloodier in the cold war era, Western liberal democracies largely retreated from front-line duties. That retreat may be linked to distinctive democratic attitudes towards armed violence: democracies are said to be profoundly sensitive to casualties, especially where casualties happen in foreign conflicts of little perceived national interest, according to

Table 2. Financial contributions to peacekeeping by nation 2015

Country	Percentage of total peacekeeping budget (2015) (%)
United States	28.38
Japan	10.83
France	7.22
Germany	7.14
UK	6.68
China	6.64
Italy	4.45
Russian Federation	3.15
Canada	2.98
Spain	2.97

Source: All data from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml (accessed 20 May 2015).

democratic peace theory (DPT). Research suggests that democracies are willing to go to war when directly threatened or provoked (and in such instances are more likely to prevail than non-democracies). However, the risk of punishment by the electorate for military campaigns judged to be too costly, unsuccessful or unnecessary, is said to moderate the desire of democratic leaders to go to war.[15] Democratic accountability means elected officials are less likely to support painful or costly military campaigns unless they can be easily justified to the population.[16] In other words, democracies should be less willing to engage in seemingly unnecessary or adventurist military campaigns.[17]

Indeed, the significantly higher casualty rates of post-cold war missions gave rise to strong public pressure against the deployment of Western troops into conflicts in which their governments had no clear interest.[18] For example, the USA unilaterally disengaged its 25,000 soldiers from the mission in Somalia after losing 18 soldiers in 1993 and Belgium pulled out of Rwanda after the loss of 10 of its peacekeeping troops.[19] 'When Americans asked themselves how many American lives it was worth to save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives', John Mueller wrote in the aftermath of the infamous 'Black Hawk Down' incident, 'the answer came out rather close to zero'.[20] One might conclude that the American people – indeed most Westerners – prefer that others fight and die in their place when the need for peacekeepers arises.[21]

Despite their risk aversion, however, democracies continue to go to war. For example, post-11 September, the United States committed its military to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as did American allies and traditional peacekeeping nations Canada, the UK and others. In these examples, armed intervention occurred outside of the UN, undermining the multilateral framework that characterizes peacekeeping and further siphoning off well-trained Western troops from traditional UN peacekeeping missions. In other words, such missions have had the additional effect of reducing the number of Western troops available to the UN. Developing states, however, have been willing and even eager to fill the void, so long as developed countries foot the bill.

The most immediate consequence of these shifts has undoubtedly been the general decline in the quality of peacekeeping, the efficacy of which was already a subject of scholarly debate.[22] The UN lamented that 'some countries have provided soldiers without rifles, or with rifles but no helmets, or with berets but no flak jackets, or with no organic transport capability (trucks or troops carriers) [...] troops [...] untrained in peacekeeping operations'.[23] This has manifested in repeated battlefield failures.[24] Moreover, troubling allegations of sexual abuse, child abuse, solicitation of prostitution and other widespread violations of human rights have been levelled against UN peacekeepers in numerous missions, including Haiti, Liberia, Sudan, Burundi and Cote D'Ivoire.[25]

In response, the UN struck a commission led by Lakhdar Brahimi. The resulting *Brahimi Report* (hereafter *Brahimi*) acknowledged and catalogued the numerous shortcomings of recent missions and suggested various improvements that could be made, for example additional training for new peacekeeping nations and the recommitment of traditional peacekeepers to second generation peacekeeping missions.[26] *Brahimi* further argued that the Global North should not only pick up the cost of peacekeeping, supply materiel and provide enhanced training, as they had been doing since the end of the cold war (see Tables 2 and 4), but should also increase the numbers of personnel. Recommendations from *Brahimi* resulted in UN Security Council Resolution 1327, which called for additional resources to be made available to peacekeeping nations, among other things. While not all of the recommendations in *Brahimi* have been implemented, this provision has met with some success, as seen in Table 4. Recent allegations of sexual misconduct have prompted renewed criticism of peacekeepers. In response, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has echoed *Brahimi*, calling for additional resources and an expanded role for developed nations.[27]

Table 3. Military spending by current (2011) top UN peacekeepers in constant $US (million)

Country	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	Change (%)
Pakistan	3,856	4,337	4,193	5,572	5,661	8,537	31.8
Bangladesh	496	729	888	893	1,298	2,010	61.8
India	17,575	18,326	25,841	33,690	46,086	50,029	61.9
Nigeria	609	549	835	951	1,990	2,265	69.3
Egypt	4,165	3,865	4,280	4,732	4,289	4,961	2.9
Nepal	68.6	74.9	95.3	241	255	305	73
Jordan	643	513	799	809	1,367	1,268	52.9
Rwanda	111	70.6	87.6	66.6	74.5	85.9	−48.4
Ghana	29.1	58.8	91.7	76.8	125	181	76.7
Uruguay	897	719	780	625	788	915	−13.8

Source: All data from http://www.sipri.org (accessed 20 May 2015).

Table 4. UN reimbursement of money (As of july 2010)

Fiscal year	Equipment reimbursement ($)	Troops cost reimbursement ($)	Total reimbursement ($)
2001–02	16,118,800.47	81,639,023.00	97,757,826.47
2002–03	37,432,740.09	67,051,154.00	104,483,894.09
2003–04	44,296,416.36	46,713,064.00	91,009,480.36
2004–05	31,606,099.37	93,794,400.06	125,400,499.43
2005–06	84,182,738.40	161,861,802.37	246,044,540.77
2006–07	79,046,617.94	136,366,902.22	215,413,520.16
2007–08	49,200,697.85	105,868,967.55	154,887,665.40
2008–09	27,844,530.37	95,053,666.20	122,898,196.57
2009–10	48,936,327.81	80,945,156.00	129,881,483.81
Total	418,664,968.66	869,294,153.40	1,287,777,107.06

Source: R. Uz Zaman and N. Biswas, 'Bangladesh', in A. Bellamy and P. Williams (eds), *Providing Peacekeepers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.189.

Today, the consequences of deploying poorly equipped and poorly trained troops, in many cases drawn from states with relatively poor human rights records, to meet the increased demands of second generation peacekeeping are well documented. However, the impact of peacekeeping on peacekeeping sending nations, many of which are transitional regimes, has only recently become the subject of investigation and debate. The underlying values of peacekeeping have commonly been associated with those of democracy and especially liberal internationalism.[28] Echoing work on the democratic peace, these approaches can be broken into institutional and normative explanations.[29] For example, Findlay and Worboys argue that peacekeeping keeps meddlesome troops abroad and, therefore, less able to interfere in the internal affairs of the state.[30] Similarly, Cunliffe has suggested that peacekeeping helps compensate the military, which in turn undermines their praetorian tendencies. In other words, peacekeeping is a way to buy off the military in exchange for their departure from politics, enabling the successful transition to democracy. These explanations have sometimes been referred to as the 'diversionary theory' of peace. Peacekeeping is also said to necessitate the extension of bureaucratic control over the military, shifting the balance of civil–military relations to elected authorities.[31] Moskos *et al.*, Norden, Worboys and others, argue that involvement in peacekeeping socializes sending nations by exposing them to the cosmopolitan values held by the United Nations and other Western nations, particularly the respect for human rights and the rule of law.[32] In short, these authors claim that by buying off their militaries, strengthening civilian control and entrenching liberal norms, second generation peacekeeping has had a pro-democratizing effect on contributing states.

More recently, however, several authors have questioned the democratic peacekeeping hypothesis. For example, Cunliffe questions why the causal relationship only appears to go in one direction: peacekeeping is only ever said to make states more democratic, never less so. However, if the mechanisms of transmission in question are strong, he argues, we should see peacekeeping failures lead to the entrenchment of less democratic norms and institutions. 'Participation in peacekeeping', he writes, 'may provide both capacity and incentive for establishing military rule'.[33] Sotomayor argues that there is nothing automatic about the relationship between peacekeeping and democratization. Despite their involvement in peacekeeping, some states appear to be more likely to democratize than others. Moreover, Sotomayor suggests that numerous conditions must be met before either democratic institutional structures or norms 'rub off' in the process of peacekeeping. Cunliffe agrees, '*if* peacekeeping deployments abroad are to help consolidate democratic transition at home, clearly some other conditions need to be met that are not specified'.[34] In the end, Sotomayor concludes that the democratic peacekeeping hypothesis is largely a 'myth'.[35]

Selectorate theory and military enhancement

As important as the debate surrounding the causal relationship between peacekeeping and democracy is, numerous factors promote and confound nascent democratic institutions, as Cunliffe and Sotomayor indicate.[36] Indeed, the causal relationship even in the much more mature democratic peace research project remains unresolved.[37] In order to focus more closely at the meso-level, we focus on the impact of Western military aid on the political status of recipient militaries. Not only does the West compensate sending states for the use of their militaries with financial aid, it also provides training and materiel. Borrowing from selectorate theory, we argue that new resources likely empower militaries, potentially facilitating coups and entrenching military government.

Selectorate theory offers a stylized account of how leaders gain and retain power. Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* define a selectorate as 'the set of people with a say in choosing leaders and with a prospect of gaining access to special privileges doled out by leaders'.[38] In order to secure their rule, leaders must maintain a 'winning coalition'. This coalition comprises the minimum group of people from within the selectorate whose support is required to maintain power, given the prevailing rules and norms of a particular regime. Winning coalitions vary in size and composition depending on regime type. In a democracy the winning coalition is quite large – a majority, or at least a plurality, of the electorate, along with those elites necessary to facilitate electoral victory. In autocratic regimes, the number of people required to stay in power is generally far smaller, often a small subset of elites drawn from the military, industry, leaders' family relations and others. Leaders maintain their winning coalitions through the distribution of various 'goods', broadly defined. The size of the winning coalition will therefore dictate the strategies an actor will employ, given their desire to remain in power. Where the form of the winning coalition shifts, so too will the strategy necessary to maintain it.

Developing countries may be especially prone to shifts in the content of the winning coalition, because their selectorates are more likely to be both smaller and less stable. In new or weak democracies, the role of elites is presumably especially important, since institutional weakness makes power outside formal democratic institutions relatively more important. Such power may take the form of patronage networks, or informal expansions of formal institutional roles. The latter may include an outsized political role for military elites. In non-democracies, with smaller selectorates comprised of regime insiders, such elites are necessarily important. In either case, militaries with new resources are likely to experience a spike in their ability to interfere in politics.

UN-supplied materiel and training are often granted directly to developing world militaries, bypassing civilian authorities, particularly when they are on peacekeeping duties or training abroad. Furthermore, aid and

reimbursements are typically allocated for the expressed purposes of peace-keeping duties, not to the treasury that receives payments on their behalf. New funds, materiel and prestige, all secured without government help, may embolden developing world militaries. Since the selectorate is small and unstable, the impact of empowering the military may be significant: civilian leaders (elected or otherwise) may have trouble maintaining influence over a sufficient portion of the selectorate. The relatively sudden and exogenous shock of external military funding will make controlling the winning coalition difficult. The result of a newly empowered and emboldened military may be a coup, as military elites find themselves able to depose the existing government.[39] This is our *hypothesis 1*: external peacekeeping funding to developing states increases the risk of military coups.

Following a coup, new leaders face new circumstances, wherein support for peacekeeping seems likely to entrench military rule. This may occur in two ways. First, military leaders need not satisfy a large group in order to maintain their winning coalition, since the autocratic selectorate is much smaller. Instead, peacekeeping provides autocratic leaders with resources that may be distributed as private goods to their winning coalition. Second, foreign funding will have made their militaries, and thus domestic coercive apparatuses, more robust. Resources intended for use in keeping peace abroad may well provide autocratic leaders with additional material capacity to suppress dissent.[40] This, then, is *hypothesis 2*: where military rule is in place, external support for peacekeeping risks entrenching it, making democratization more difficult, and (where democratization has occurred) making a return to military rule more likely.

Broadly, the recent history of UN peacekeeping seems consistent with this account, insofar as our independent variable – support for peacekeeping – has indeed risen sharply. Since *Brahimi*, sending states have been provided better weapons, transportation, communications and other equipment. They have also been better trained. The aim has been not just to bolster skills and improve capabilities, but also to impose greater discipline and prevent further battlefield lapses. While the intent was to make better peacekeepers, these investments have necessarily enhanced the overall size and military proficiency and professionalism of sending states. In all but two states, military expenditures went up, in part because of Western aid. Table 3 shows the change in military expenditures among the current top UN peacekeepers.

In the two cases below, we explore that funding and its impact, in line with the two hypotheses above. These claims give rise to a range of methodological issues: since military coups may have multiple causes and developing states may have multiple general sources of external funding – foreign aid, foreign direct investment, among others. Broadly speaking, there are potentially a great many variables at work. Conclusively determining a causal relationship is concomitantly difficult. These cases are thus intended to

probe the plausibility of the thesis, by evaluating it in relatively strong settings, such that 'the theory could hardly be expected to hold widely if it did not fit closely there'.[41] This 'plausibility probe' provides evidence that the theory is not groundless, and justifies a possible subsequent, more extensive (perhaps large-*N*) test. In the present article, our purpose remains exploratory: to establish the viability of the theory.

Case: Fiji

Fiji is a small archipelagic nation of 800,000 people, which faces few internal or external threats. Nevertheless, it increasingly maintains an outsized military. Fiji has increasingly taken on international peacekeeping obligations, and the Western funding that comes with it, growing a costly security apparatus that it previously did not have or need. As a result, where the army was once a small force with little institutional clout or material power, it now has the capacity to intervene in domestic politics. And indeed, it has: in the last 20 years the Fijian military has prosecuted no less than four coups, gradually reshaping state institutions to entrench its role in the political system. The Fijian military prosecuted its first coup against civilian authorities in 1987, overthrowing the government and triggering a constitutional rewrite. In so doing, the army took an even more active role in the politics of the state and granted itself a veto power over Fiji's elected government, paving the way for subsequent coups in 2000 and 2006.[42]

The Fijian propensity to military intervention in politics has been explained variously as a product of ethnic tensions, class conflict, the threat of communism and a simple desire for self-preservation. Numerous authors note that the cleavages between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians had widened since independence.[43] Indeed, the 1987 coup was prosecuted by an increasingly indigenous-dominated military against an Indo-Fijian coalition that had formed a government for the first time in the nation's history.[44] Moreover, the coup came at a time of increasing economic turbulence and dislocation, which the military publically blamed on Indo-Fijians.[45] On this account, the coup was justified as an attempt to restore the social and economic rights of the indigenous population.

Others note that there was a palpable fear of the spread of communism on the archipelago, particularly after the election of the left-leaning Indo-Fijian coalition.[46] On this account the military intervened because it was concerned about the allegiance of the new coalition and mindful of the spread of communism.[47] Finally, Scobell argues that the military intervened in politics only after the new coalition government threatened to reduce its ranks and shrink its budget, and not because of incipient economic or ethnic problems.[48] Similar explanations have tended to accompany the subsequent 2000 and

2006 coups. However, while much has been written about the causes of or pretexts for the various coups, to date no study has probed the enabling conditions: what has made repeated coups possible in Fiji? In other words, the 'why' question has been sufficiently answered, but not the 'how' question.

Fiji has little need for a military other than for peacekeeping. Unlike many others states that gained their independence through conflict, the decolonization of Fiji was a relatively tranquil affair, coming through a negotiated settlement with the British.[49] Upon gaining independence, Fiji underwent a peaceful transition to democratic rule. Nor does Fiji face external threats that would necessitate a strong military, its remoteness being its greatest defensive asset. Lacking much in terms of external or internal threats, Fiji does not require a large military force.[50] Nor does its post-independence military history suggest a predisposition to coups. Upon gaining independence in 1970, Fiji's entire military apparatus had a mere 200 personnel, with little materiel and less experience.[51] However, as the newly independent nation began participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations, its armed forces underwent a massive expansion. Within two years of joining the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission in southern Lebanon its budget had been tripled and it had two battalions of combat ready troops at its disposal (up from one). Another battalion was added after joining the Sinai mission.[52] The process of enlargement continued apace, as Fiji joined peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Kosovo, East Timor, Syria and others as well as the American-led multilateral missions in Iraq.

By 1987, the year of the first coup, the Fijian military had grown to approximately 6,000 full-time personnel, a 30-fold increase in size since independence.[53] Today the military comprises a substantially higher proportion of the population in Fiji than neighbouring Papua New Guinea (0.5/1,000), New Zealand (2.8/1,000) or Australia (3.9/1,000). Indeed, at 10.1 soldiers for every 1,000 citizens, Fiji has become among the most militarized states in the world.[54] The increase in the size of the Fijian military was both necessitated by the demands of peacekeeping and enabled by funds from the United Nations and various donor states, which compensate Fiji directly for each soldier it contributes to peacekeeping missions abroad.

Not only has it increased in size as a direct result of peacekeeping, the Fijian military has also gained better equipment, training, experience and confidence. In particular, the Fijian military receives substantial financial, logistical and training support from Australia's Defence Cooperation Programme.[55] This support has included the construction of base facilities, military hospitals and various other types of military infrastructure. Perhaps more important, Fijian troops returned from active combat missions experienced and battle hardened. Where the post-independence military was small and anaemic, the consequence of years of peacekeeping was a larger, more experienced, better trained and better equipped military.

Together, these have provided the Fijian military with the means to intervene regularly in the political affairs of the country. While the 1987 coup was a relatively modest affair – parliament was captured by ten soldiers without exchange of gunfire and was resolved via negotiation – later coups were much broader affairs, involving extensive planning, greater military activity and more heavy-handedness. In 2000, for example, parliament was captured after gunfire was exchanged, the sitting prime minister was forcibly evacuated to a naval vessel offshore and martial law was declared, all in short order. In 2006, the military set up roadblocks at strategic locations around the country, and seized weapons from opposing factions and the police. They proceeded to seize the mobile phones of government ministers, impound their cars and placed them under house arrest. When they surrounded parliament, the sitting prime minister had little choice but to dissolve parliament and cede power to the military. Veterans of various UN peacekeeping campaigns, such as Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, who had served with the UNIFIL, and Commodore Frank Bainimarama who led Fiji's Sinai force, transformed a small and once largely apolitical military into one bent on political intervention and increasingly capable of doing so.[56] The pre-peacekeeping military was simply too small and too inexperienced to orchestrate an effective takeover of the country.

These repeated interventions have afforded the military the opportunity to reshape the selectorate favourably. For example, Bainimarama purged the government of ministers and civil servants who had been critical of or refused to cooperate with the military in the wake of the 2006 coup. Most notably, Bainimarama dismissed the prime minister, vice president, police commissioner and the head of the election commission, replacing them with loyalists. Indeed, even after returning the government to civilian control in 2007, current and former military men of an indigenous Fijian ethnic background continue to hold senior positions in various critical ministries, most notably the police.

Not only had the Fijian military developed the material capacity needed to prosecute a successful coup effectively, peacekeeping had also provided it the crucial resources to retain power. In an otherwise poor society, military service has become a crucial source of employment, particularly for ethnic Fijians. Remittances from soldiers stationed abroad on peacekeeping missions make up a substantial part of Fiji's foreign-exchange earnings.[57] The effect is not confined to active duty soldiers and their dependants, as the military distributes benefits to tens of thousands of active duty and reserve soldiers, as well as those retired from the service. With some 20,000–25,000 Fijians deployed abroad in a peacekeeping capacity over the past decades, this effect has become amplified over time.[58] Such resources have provided the Fijian military with increased political leverage over the selectorate.

Fiji, a state lacking any 'natural' threats, developed an outsized military apparatus largely under the auspices of the United Nations. However, the internationally funded, trained and equipped Fijian military not only engaged in peacekeeping duties, it also repeatedly intervened in the affairs of the state. Indeed, the increasingly praetorian role that the military has assumed would have been virtually impossible in the absence of United Nations and donor funding provided in exchange for their participation in overseas peacekeeping missions.[59] Twenty years prior, the military was simply too anaemic to attempt a coup. After 20 years of peacekeeping, however, this had changed. The military was larger, better trained and equipped, and well seasoned. Not only did peacekeeping enlarge and embolden the military, better enabling it to intervene domestically, the international community has provided additional resources with which it has ensured the loyalty of its constituents. Indeed, the rank-and-file has proved remarkably willing to follow their superiors in repeated coups, many of which have proved contentious among the average Fijian.[60] Where many military coups fail,[61] every coup in Fiji has succeeded, in part because the military has entrenched itself in various ministries and maintained the support of the selectorate (i.e. ethnic Fijians). In sum, the United Nations has created some of the necessary conditions for repeated coups in Fiji (though not sufficient) these are otherwise known as contributing factors. Using both its coercive power and the spoils from peacekeeping, it has been able to reshape political institutions and entrench itself in the political life of that country.

Furthermore, participation in peacekeeping seems to have insulated the Fijian military from most international criticism. In the lead-up to the 2006 coup, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned the Fijian military that it risked jeopardizing future participation in peacekeeping if it overthrew the elected government.[62] Australia and New Zealand similarly admonished the Junta, and it was twice suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations. Nonetheless, the United Nations continues to draw on Fijian troops, Australia and New Zealand continue to support the Fijian military with money, training and material and Fiji has been reinstated to the Commonwealth. Despite continued interference in politics, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon muted his criticism of the Fijian military, choosing to praise it instead.[63]

Case: Bangladesh

Since gaining independence in 1971, Bangladesh has suffered from repeated military coups.[64] Nevertheless, the international community has proved remarkably willing to train, equip and subsidize the Bangladeshi military in exchange for peacekeeping duties, despite its troubling history of interference in politics. Indeed, the Bangladesh military has continued to receive substantial international support in spite of repeated coups. Bangladesh has become a

major source of soldiers for second generation peacekeeping operations. Indeed, it is currently the biggest contributor of manpower to United Nations peacekeeping operations, having more than 10,000 personnel deployed in various missions around the world, which amounts to approximately 10 per cent of the overall number of blue helmets. Some 100,000 Bangladeshi military personnel have served in the United Nations peacekeeping forces since 1988, when it began contributing troops.[65]

First and foremost, peacekeeping has enabled the Bangladesh military to modernize and expand.[66] The Bangladesh military has received significant financial support from the United Nations and international donors in exchange for peacekeeping. These have come in two forms: cash reimbursements for troop and hardware contributions and low cost loans. The former amounted to nearly US$1.3 billion in the last decade alone (see Table 4).[67] Reports on loan arrangements tied to peacekeeping are hard to come by, but in one instance alone Bangladesh signed a US$1 billion agreement with Russia to purchase military hardware, including combat helicopters, trainer aircraft and armoured personnel carriers, financed in part against expected UN reimbursements.[68] According to then United Nations Under-Secretary-General Ameera Haq, these funds were provided explicitly to modernize and improve the Bangladesh military, following the recommendations laid out in *Brahimi*.[69]

In addition to modern equipment, the Bangladesh military has also received support for training and the benefit of international expertise since becoming a contributor to peacekeeping missions. In particular, the US military has provided support for advanced training in tactics and planning. With US financial assistance, the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training (BIPSOT) was established. In 2012 alone the United States provided US$1.375 million for support and training equipment in addition to US$3.6 million to upgrade BIPSOT training facilities.[70] More important, however, the Bangladesh military has benefited from international expertise and experience. Since becoming a peacekeeping force, Bangladesh has adopted the US Army tactical planning procedures and education system and through their deployments overseas Bangladeshi soldiers have been able to improve their professional acumen and expertise, particularly through their repeated interaction with foreign military forces.[71]

Peacekeeping provided a lucrative source of revenue not only for the Bangladesh military and government, but also for its soldiers and their families (see Table 4). Indeed, peacekeeping has come to play a crucial role in the overall Bangladeshi economy.[72] In recent years troops stationed abroad on peacekeeping duties sent back US$1.24 billion, which amounts to nearly 10 per cent of all remittances.[73] On average, soldiers earn an estimated US$1,000 a month while deployed on UN missions, compared to their regular US$180 monthly salary back home. Some earned considerably

more. A one-year UN tour nets senior officers around US$30,000 and pilots in the Bangladesh Air Force earn as much as US$3,000 per flying hour.[74] Given the relatively low per capita Gross National Income of Bangladesh – approximately US$700 – these remittances represent a significant source of revenue for peacekeepers. As the point of access to these resources, the Bangladeshi military has experienced an increase in its domestic political clout.

Though the Bangladesh military's interference in politics long predated its involvement in peacekeeping, its praetorian role has grown in recent years. In fact, after a period of relative stability, the military has staged repeated interventions in politics in 1996, 2007 and 2011.[75] The 1996 and 2011 coups – both of which were ultimately aborted – were staged after the government attempted to exercise control over the military. In 1996 president Biswas urged the head of the military, General Nasim, to retire forcibly senior officers who were ostensibly involved with the opposition. Nasim refused, sparking a crisis, which culminated in troops descending on the capitol. Similarly, government intervention in military affairs is said to have prompted the 2011 coup attempt.[76] The leaders of the 2007 coup, on the other hand, claimed that their intervention was meant to stop the political violence and corruption marring upcoming elections. However, that coup, led by Lt. General Moeen Ahmed, a veteran of UN peacekeeping, may have been motivated by future peacekeeping opportunities, according to leaked documents.[77] Senior Bangladeshi military officials were allegedly worried that the UN might turn elsewhere for peacekeepers so long as the prevailing climate of corruption and instability persisted. Had the UN turned elsewhere a major source of 'prestige and financial rewards' would have been jeopardized.

As in the Fijian case, the UN has offered little censure or sanction of the Bangladeshi military, despite its ongoing meddling in politics. Despite warning the military that its 'actions' – a euphemism for repeated coups – would 'have implications for its involvement in UN peacekeeping contracts', to date, the Bangladesh military has suffered no meaningful consequences.[78] Indeed, according to the *Economist* the UN provided tacit approval for the 2007 coup, which is in line with the account above.[79] Not only does Bangladesh continue to participate fully in peacekeeping missions and enjoy the full funding and support to which they are entitled, they have expanded the scope of their involvement considerably since 1988 and were elected to the Security Council from 2000–02.

The UN and the international community have supported Bangladesh with training, material and money in the hopes that these would enable the military to perform its peacekeeping duties better. But they have also enabled the military to expand, modernize and professionalize its forces more generally. It is difficult to draw a robust link between peacekeeping duties and the prospects for democratization or military interference in Bangladesh, given the size of the armed forces and the overall population. Though peacekeeping has

provided a lucrative source of revenue, training and material, with a budget of US$2 billion per annum and more than 400,000 personnel, it is hard to determine what if any role these have played in the affairs of the military.[80] Though large in absolute terms, peacekeeping generates only modest revenue when compared to the overall budget of the Bangladesh military or the gross national income (GNI) of a country of more than 150 million people. Moreover, the Bangladesh armed forces have long played a praetorian role in the political affairs of that country, meddling dozens of times since the founding of the state. Though the 2007 coup was led by a veteran of peacekeeping affairs, the greatest number of coups occurred between 1975 and 1982, predating Bangladesh's involvement in peacekeeping duties altogether. Nevertheless, peacekeeping has provided additional resources, enabling the military to expand and professionalize and better pay those under its command.[81] The evidence we document here remains *consistent with* our theoretical expectations. Thus, while the case to be made here is less strong than that concerning Fiji, it nonetheless justifies further research.

Conclusion

Since the end of the cold war, the UN has increasingly responded to international crises with more active forms of intervention. In fact, more missions were created after the cold war than in the 45 years prior combined, most to address internal conflicts. The increasing number and complexity of these missions has necessitated a size and scope of peacekeeping operations not seen before. Developing countries have assumed this burden, contributing necessary troops, while the developed world has continued to pick up the tab. The first, and most obvious, consequence of this shift – concerns over the decline in the quality of peacekeeping – have been widely noted elsewhere. In this article we have begun to explore other consequences of the changing nature of peacekeeping, focusing on troop contributing countries from the developing world.

UN-backed aid for peacekeeping may undermine democracy in troop contributing states. Deploying selectorate theory, we suggest that developing states that gain outsized militaries through UN peacekeeping funding may be especially prone to coups. Where coups have occurred, UN resources may entrench military rule, or make its recurrence more likely. Commitment to liberal interventionism may have the unintended effect of producing or entrenching illiberal regimes in contributing states, contributing to domestic repression. Peacekeeping furnishes developing nations – many of whom are autocratic – with the opportunity to field a quantity and quality of armed forces that in some cases would not otherwise be possible. Liberal democracies in the developed world are thus increasingly funding the coercive apparatus of autocratic regimes in the name of liberal internationalist values.

We do not claim there is a straightforward causal relationship between peacekeeping and coups, domestic repression or instability. In some cases, like Bangladesh, such phenomena occurred before the shift to peacekeeping. For some developing troop contributors, such as India and Ghana, the process of democratization has continued unabated. However, peacekeeping can be said to *enable* or *facilitate* domestic repression when autocratic forces benefit from their involvement in UN peacekeeping, through better training and equipment for their coercive apparatus or resources that increases the military's status in domestic politics, and can be distributed by military rulers among their winning coalition, thus enabling autocratic rulers to stay in power. Clearly, other factors are likely at work in cases such as these. Contributing states' histories of colonialism may contribute to weak democratic institutions, as may economic underdevelopment. However, where such conditions are in place – as they are in the two cases above, and in several other contributing states as well – support for peacekeeping may be an important contributing cause, or intervening variable, shaping the likelihood of coups or autocratic repression. For example, in the case of Fiji above, it seems unlikely widespread military intervention in domestic politics could have occurred without UN-backed, peacekeeping-driven expansion of the military itself. In that instance at least, while other factors may also have been at work, support for peacekeeping seems to have been a necessary condition for the proliferation of coups, and repression that followed. In others, it may simply be a contributing factor.

Empirically, the present article takes the form of a plausibility probe. We have aimed to trace connections and draw linkages in two exploratory cases. Similar conclusions might well be drawn about numerous other recent contributors to peacekeeping, such as Pakistan, Nepal, Egypt, Burundi[82] and others. As with Fiji and Bangladesh, these states have received extensive financial support, material transfers, experience and training in exchange for peacekeeping. Moreover, their militaries have played prominent roles in the various civil wars, coups and political revolutions that have plagued them in recent years. However, these countries are simply too large and the effects of peacekeeping too small to come to any meaningful causal conclusions concerning the relationship between the two. Future studies might therefore explore these cases in greater detail, or evaluate them quantitatively.

In response to the troubling reports of human rights abuses among peacekeepers, the *Brahimi Report* called on UN personnel to be held accountable for their lapses. More than a decade ago, *Brahimi* noted:

> the success of a mission and the credibility of the Organization can all hinge on what a few individuals do or fail to do. Anyone who turns out to be unsuited to the task that he or she has agreed to perform must be removed from a mission, no matter how high or how low they may be on the ladder.[83]

However anaemic, the language of *Brahimi* called for moral (if not legal) responsibility for the human rights violations that had tarnished the Organization over the first decade of the new millennium. If the shift in peacekeeping has precipitated other worrying changes, as this article has argued, further action may be warranted. In particular, the UN might consider actions to prevent leakage of funds or material intended solely for peacekeeping. This could be accomplished through greater scrutiny and oversight, the imposition of real sanctions against peacekeepers who transgress the norms of the organization, as it has repeatedly promised, but failed to follow through on. Future research might also focus on those peacekeeping countries, like Ghana and India, in which the process of democratization has continued apace. Differentiating them from the cases above is, presumably, an important task. Meanwhile, the demand for peacekeeping has not abated, and other developing world states have expressed interest in contributing to future missions. Kazakhstan, for example, is reported to have taken an interest in participating in African peacekeeping operations.[84] As additional states – many of them illiberal – become involved in peacekeeping the need to investigate further, document and ultimately prevent the unintended consequences of peacekeeping will become paramount.

Notes

1. Lakhdar Brahimi, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations', UN doc., A/55/305, 2000; Michael Lipson, 'Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocricsy?', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.13, No.1, 2007, pp.5–34; R.C. Thakur, C. Aoi and C. De Coning (eds), *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*, New York: United Nations University Press, 2007; UN, 'Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People', UN doc., A/70/95, 2015; Somini Sengupta and Rick Gladstone, 'Panel Urges Changes in Using U.N. Soldiers', *New York Times*, 16 Jun. 2015 (at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/panel-urges-changes-in-using-un-soldiers.html?_r=0); Somini Sengupta, 'As Conflicts Multiply, Peacekeeping Confronts an Identity Crisis', *New York Times*, 16 Sept. 2015 (at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/international-peacekeepers-confront-a-crisis-from-within.html).
2. C.f. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R Segal, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Deborah L. Norden, 'Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina's UN Missions', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.2, No.3, 1995, pp.330–349; Arturo C. Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil–Military Relations and the United Nations*, Baltimore: JHU Press, 2013; Andreas Andersson, 'Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–1996', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.7, No.2, 2000, pp.1–22; Andreas Andersson, 'United Nations Intervention by United Democracies? State Commitment to UN Interventions 1991–99', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.37, No.4, 2002, pp.184–199; James Lebovic, 'Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.48, No.6, 2004, pp.910–936; Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, 'Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping

and the Globalization of Security', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.12, No.2, 2005, pp.139–156; Katherine J. Worboys, 'The Traumatic Journey from Dictatorship to Democracy Peacekeeping Operations and Civil–Military Relations in Argentina, 1989–1999', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.33 No.2, 2007, pp.149–168; Trevor Findlay, *The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping*, Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, 1996.

3. C.f. Sotomayor (see n.2 above); Philip Cunliffe, *From Peacekeepers to Praetorians: How Participating in Peacekeeping Operations May Subvert Democracy: The Cases of Bangladesh, Fiji and the Gambia*, forthcoming.

4. B. Bueno de Mesquita, A. Smith, R.M. Siverson and J.D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005.

5. On contributing conditions see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005; David Collier and James Mahoney, 'Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research', *World Politics*, Vol.49, No.1, 1996, pp.56–91.

6. George and Bennett (see n.5 above), p.75. See also Harry Eckstein, 'Case Study and Theory in Political Science', in Fred L. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds), *Handbook of Political Science*, Addison Wesley, 1975, pp.79–137. Plausibility probes have recently been used elsewhere in the study of world politics: see Todd Hall and Karen Yarhi-Milo, 'The Personal Touch: Leaders' Impressions, Costly Signaling, and Assessments of Sincerity in International Affairs', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.56, 2012, pp.560–573, emphasis in original; Ted Hopf, 'Common Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics', *International Organization*, Vol.67, No.2, 2013, pp.317–354.

7. For an excellent overview, see Norrie MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System*, New York: Routledge, 2006; Philip Cunliffe, *Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South*, London: C.H. Hurst & Co., 2013.

8. Chapter 6, for example, grants the Security Council the power to mediate international disputes and Chapter 7 provides such mechanisms as economic, diplomatic and other sanctions, as well as the use of force, to resolve such disputes.

9. Kalevi Holsti, 'War, Peace, and the State of the State', *International Political Science Review*, Vol.16, No.4, 1995, pp.319–39.

10. C. Dandeker and J. Gow, 'Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol.10, No.2, 1999, pp.58–79.

11. Stephen Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, pp.5–53.

12. On middle power, see Andrew Fenton Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1997; Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1984.

13. Barry Ashton, 'Making Peace Agreements Work: United Nations Experience in the Former Yugoslavia', *Cornell International Law Journal*, Vol.30, No.3, 1997, p.781.

14. Brahimi (see n.1 above), pp.17–18.

15. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

16. Zev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.87, No.3, 1993, pp.624–38; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, J. Morrow, R. Siverson and A. Smith, 'An Institutional Explanation

of the Democratic Peace', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.93, No.4, 1999, pp.791–807; John Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', *International Security*, Vol.19, No.2, 1994, pp.87–125.

17. The question of precisely how members of the general public are influenced in their decisions to support interventions is complex. For a sceptical view of the influence of casualties on public opinion, see James Burk, 'Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.114, No.1, 1999, pp.53–78. Berinsky has recently argued that publics are influenced more by elite discourse than by casualties or other cost–benefit analyses. Adam Berinsky, 'Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict', *Journal of Politics*, Vol.69, No.4, 2007, 975–997. For a review of casualty aversion, see Hugh Smith, 'What Costs Will Democracies Bear? A Review of Popular Theories of Casualty Aversion', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.31, No.4, 2005, pp.487–512.

18. Michael Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*, New York: Grove Press, 2010; R. Eichenberg, 'Victory Has Many Friends: US Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981–2005', *International Security*, Vol.30, No.1, 2005, 140–177; John Mueller, 'Policy Principles for Unthreatened Wealth-Seekers', *Foreign Policy*, Vol.102, No.102, 1996, pp.22–33.

19. Catherine Hartzell and M. Hoddie, 'From Anarchy to Security: Comparing Theoretical Approaches to the Process of Disarmament Following Civil War', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 27, No.1, 2006, p.164. There is, admittedly, a larger trend here, wherein developing world states have performed poorly in the field, as with the Dutch in Bosnia or Belgians in Rwanda. Still, their sending states have responded quite differently than have developing ones, by simply removing their troops from the field.

20. Mueller (see n.18 above), p.31.

21. S.T. Hosmer, *Constraints on US Strategy in Third World Conflict*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1985.

22. C.f. Brahimi (see n.1 above); Lipson (see n.1 above); Thakur, Aoi and De Coning.

23. Brahimi (see n.1 above), p.18.

24. David Rohde, 'The UN Keeps Failing, Right When We Really Need It', *The Atlantic*, 12 Apr. 2013 (at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/the-un-keeps-failing-right-when-we-really-need-it/274962/); Sudarsan Raghavan, 'Record Number of UN Peacekeepers Fails to Stop African 'Wars', *Washington Post*, 2 Jan. 2014 (at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/record-number-of-un-peacekeepers-fails-to-stop-african-wars/2014/01/03/17ed0574-7487-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html); Adam Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping', *Survival*, Vol.36, No.3, 1994, pp.93–120.

25. C. Lynch, 'UN Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo; Peacekeepers Accused in Draft Report', *Washington Post*, Dec. 16 2004, p.A26; S.A. Notar, 'Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', *American Undergraduate Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law*, Vol.14, No.2, 2006, p.413; K. Grady, 'Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers: A Threat to Impartiality', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.17, No.2, 2010, pp.215–228; C. Csaky and Fund Save the Children, *No One to Turn To: The Under-Reporting of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Aid Workers and Peacekeepers*, Save the Children, 2008; Hartzell and Hoddie (see n.19 above), p.163.

26. Brahimi (see n.1 above), pp.2, 19.

27. UN (see n.1 above); Sengupta and Gladstone (see n.1 above); Sengupta (see n.1 above).
28. C.f. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (see n.2 above); Andersson 2000 (see n.2 above); Lebovic (see n.2 above); Worboys (see n.2 above); Cunliffe (see n.3 above).
29. C.f. de Mesquita *et al.* (see n.16 above); M. Doyle and B. Russett; Maoz and Russett (see n.16 above); Owen (see n.16 above).
30. Findlay (see n.2 above); Worboys (see n.2 above).
31. Cunliffe, p.3 (see n.3 above).
32. Moskos *et al.* (see n.2 above); Sotomayor (see n.2 above); Findlay (see n.2 above); Worboys (see n.2 above).
33. See discussion in Cunliffe, p.16 (see n.3 above).
34. Ibid, emphasis in original.
35. Sotomayor (see n.2 above).
36. Cunliffe (see n.3 above); Sotomayor (see n.2 above).
37. C.f. John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol.15, No.1, 1990, pp.5–56; Steve Chan, 'In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise', *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol.41, No.1, 1997, pp.59–91; Sebastian Rosato, 'The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.97, No.4, 2003, pp.585–602; Thomas Schwartz and Kiron Skinner, 'The Myth of the Democratic Peace', *Orbis*, Vol.46, No.1, 2003, pp.159–72.
38. Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (see n.4 above), p.xi. See also Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (n.16 above), pp.891–7.
39. Peacekeeping funding provides military brass with the means to overthrow governments, but not necessarily the motivation. Military elites may find they want to overthrow leaders for a variety of reasons, including ending extant political uncertainty (after disputed elections, or in the face of public unrest), or may simply find political power desirable. The latter assumption is the norm in selectorate theory. For our purposes, what matters is not why officers stage coups, so much as their ability to do so.
40. Indeed, since they are also less casualty averse, military autocrats will face few contrary incentives to avoid high-risk peacekeeping missions, granting them continuing access to these resources. On relative autocratic casualty acceptance and selectorate theory, see Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (n.16 above), pp.800–2.
41. Harry Eckstein, quoted in Hall and Yarhi-Milo (see n.6 above), p.566.
42. Jone Baledrokadroka, 'The Unintended Consequences of Fiji's International Peacekeeping', *Security Challenges*, Vol.8, No.4, 2012, p.106; Andrew Scobell, 'Politics, Professionalism, and Peacekeeping: An Analysis of the 1987 Military Coup in Fiji', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.26, No.2, 1994, p.193.
43. Victor Lal, *Fiji: Coups in Paradise: Race, Politics, and Military Intervention*, Zed Books, 1990; Ralph Premdas, 'Military Intervention in Fiji: Fear of Ethnic Domination', *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol.41, No.1, 1992, pp.3–55; Ralph Premdas, *Ethnic Conflict and Development: The Case of Fiji*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995; Robert Robertson and Akosita Tamanisau, 'Fiji: Race, Class and the Military', *Development and Change*, Vol.20, No.2, 1989, pp.203–234; Scobell (see n.42 above).
44. Baledrokadroka (see n.42 above).
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Acknowledgements

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