

A Hegelian realist constructivist account of war, identity, and state formation

Joseph MacKay and Jamie Levin

Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, Sidney Smith Hall, Room 3018, 100 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3G3.

This article offers a realist constructivist account of armed conflict, based on the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel has received relatively little attention in mainstream IR theory. When he has been read, four readings have predominated: realist, liberal, critical, and normative. Instead, we link his thought to both realism and constructivism. For Hegel, a persistent struggle for recognition and identity between individuals and groups drives much of human interaction. In his account of the causes of war in *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel relates international violence not only to realist international-structural pressures, but also to nationalism, and to the internal socioeconomic imperfections of the modern state. The result is broadly realist constructivist, linking a major international phenomenon — armed conflict — to interactions between power and ideas. Previous readings of Hegel in IR have de-emphasised some or all of these features. Recovering them furnishes realist constructivism with theoretical tools for explaining the processes linking ideas and power politics — tools it has lacked thus far — in the context of a substantive phenomenon: armed conflict.

Journal of International Relations and Development (2018) **21**, 75-100.

doi:10.1057/jird.2015.24; advance online publication, 17 July 2015

Keywords: causes of war; Hegel; identity; realist constructivism; state formation

Introduction

'Realist constructivism' (Barkin 2003, 2010) aims to provide an IR theoretic framework that combines realist power politics with an emphasis on ideas and identities. However, to date, it has focused more on demonstrating the affinities between realism and constructivism than on making substantive theoretical claims. This article aims to offer such a theoretical account. It does so by linking realist constructivist thought with the international political theory of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. To date, Hegel has received relatively little attention among mainstream IR theorists.¹ When he has been addressed, four accounts predominate: Hegel as a realist, liberal, critical, or normative theorist. This essay develops a fifth account, showing how the 'struggle for recognition' between individual or corporate actors can drive recourse to violence. For Hegel, international power politics is



driven by identity formation and consolidation.² His account provides a mechanism that, when linked to the realist constructivist project, provides a substantive theory of the onset of armed conflict. States fight wars in large part to produce and reproduce national identity.

Constructivists have long argued for the centrality of ideas in international politics, claiming anarchy is ‘what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). Hegel locates ideas and identities in a related but different role. For Hegel, individual and group identities emerge out of contention or conflict. Social order thus relies upon an ‘other’, an external group against which collective identity can be asserted. Thus, while ideas are central to international politics, certain ideas will tend to be more common than others. Hegel identifies especially those that help to maintain order within the sovereign state, through the deployment of nationalist and expansionist violence, played out in international anarchy. He thus links war to both power politics and the role of collective identity formation, and provides a theory that links the two tightly. Specifically, we show that Hegel, in his *Philosophy of Right* (1967), associates war not just with realist international structural pressures, but also with the construction of coherent national identities, as states assert themselves against other sovereign nations. Hegel thus traces inter-state war to domestic processes of state formation and consolidation. This process is linked to the process of individual identity formation through dialectical contention, most clearly set out in his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1967). For Hegel, politics emerges out of the struggle for recognition, initially between individuals and later between groups. Relations between states are tied up closely with the processes that create them, and with dialectical interactions of identities within and between them.

On this account, the collective identities that maintain social cohesion within states encourage competitive and sometimes bellicose behaviour between them. International violence serves as a source of social unity, counteracting socioeconomic pressures towards social and institutional fragmentation. During peacetime, the social, economic, and political iniquities of domestic society — what Hegel refers to as ‘contingencies’ — generate tensions that may emerge publically as threats to the legitimacy of the state by undermining social cohesion. War and imperial expansion generate and consolidate national identity, as fellow feeling in the population at large that overrides selfish individualism. This occurs in part through material interest — war and empire generate economic activity and employ surplus population — but also through participation in national identity.³

This account is broadly consistent with realist constructivism: an explanatory, rather than normative, account of how ideas (norms) and power interact to shape world politics. In the *Philosophy of Right* (1967), Hegel insists on a persistent role for power in international politics. However, he also asserts a role for ideas and identities in shaping political outcomes, both in the short term and over the long arc of history. Moreover, Hegel provides theoretical tools with which to make sense of the relationship between the two. For Hegel, the mutability of anarchy is not associated



with the emergence of a more liberal world order, as it is for some constructivists. Instead, identities are sites of conflict and competition, as individuals and groups struggle against one another for recognition. Anarchy is the space in which states assert their identities against one another, contending both to attain recognition as distinctive nations internationally and to sustain coherent national identities domestically. Anarchy is not just a source of threats to states; it is also good for them, insofar as their actions in it facilitate national identity consolidation. This account constitutes a useful contribution to the realist constructivist project whose specific theoretical mechanisms are otherwise somewhat murky (Jackson and Nexon 2004).

Linking Hegel to realist constructivism provides realist constructivist theory with a more thorough framework for understanding how ideas and identities have come to shape armed conflict. In so doing, our account provides a point of entry for deploying Hegelian international thought in IR theory, making room for a canonical political theorist in the canon of IR theory. The account should be valuable for the discipline at large, providing a more secure, detailed, and specific theoretical linkage between two important IR theoretical schools — realism and constructivism. In turn, this may improve the prospects for developing empirical applications. Realist constructivist research to date has been primarily theoretical. While the present article is theory-driven as well, further fleshing out the theory should help make realist constructivism more useful in informing future empirical research. (We discuss the existing ambiguities in realist constructivism below, in the subsection on ‘Realist constructivist Hegelianism’, and later develop its linkages to Hegel more thoroughly, in the section on ‘Hegel and realist constructivism’ and again in the conclusion).

We proceed as follows. First, we review the existing realist, liberal, critical, and normative readings of Hegel, and then offer a realist constructivist formulation of his work. Second, we present the Hegelian account of identity, state formation, and armed conflict, showing how these are linked. Third, we connect the Hegelian account to the constructivist realist project. Fourth, we consider briefly some shortcomings of Hegel’s account, and show that most of them are not insurmountable. A brief conclusion summarises, considers possible empirical applications, and addresses some methodological and normative implications.

Four readings of Hegel’s international politics

Four broad schools or approaches to Hegel’s international politics tend to predominate. One views Hegel as a realist; the second sees him as a liberal, the third treats Hegel as a theoretical source for critical or postmodern accounts of international politics; and the fourth, linked to the English School, develops Hegelian theories of international ethics. In this section, we briefly survey these readings, and then argue for a fifth reading of Hegel as a hybrid realist constructivist.



Realist Hegelianisms

Realist treatments of Hegel tend to emphasise power-political elements of Hegel's thought. They note that Hegel rejected Kantian accounts of world federalism, and viewed war as an inevitable component of international politics. Carr (1946: 153), for example, found in Hegel 'states [that] are complete and morally self-sufficient entities; and relations between them express only the concordance or conflict of independent wills not united by any mutual obligation'. More recent realist readings vary. Jaeger (2002) calls Hegel a 'reluctant realist', one who recognises a 'thick' social order between states, but who nonetheless sees realist outcomes as inevitable. Brooks (2004, 2007) responds that Hegel's realism is conventional, seeing states as prone to conflict under conditions of international anarchy. Realist readings do not differ in viewing Hegelian states as self-contained entities, existing under conditions of anarchy, wherein resort to force is a constant possibility. However, Hegel's account of international politics also has a strong domestic component, wherein national politics and international armed conflict are related importantly and intimately. This focus on identity suggests an affinity with constructivism.

Liberal Hegelianisms

Liberal scholars tend to note that, while Hegel accepts the inevitability of armed conflict, he also recognises other forces at work in the international system.⁴ For example, Avineri (1972: 202) reads a broadly liberal-internationalist account into Hegel, wherein states, like individuals, seek recognition from one another (see Boucher 1998: 343; Jaeger 2002: 508). Mutual recognition and understanding give rise to the potential for international order. Generally, liberal accounts also emphasise human progress, individual rights, and positive freedoms as outcomes. War is thus tragic and to be avoided, although it cannot always be. Elsewhere, Mertens (1995) and Gordon (2000) contend that Hegel shares much of Kant's view, giving war a regulative rather than destructive role in world politics. While there are limits to Hegel's liberalism, other accounts revise Hegel to be more directly liberal. None is more famous, or controversial, than Fukuyama's (1993) account of history ending with the post-Cold War victory of Western liberal democracy over Soviet communism. Kojève's (1969) emphasis on the 'end of history' provided a foundation for Fukuyama's framework.⁵ Liberal readings of Hegel share a recognition of wars as battles of ideas as much as arms. However, this emphasis on contending ideas and identities suggests a constructivist account, linked to realist power politics.⁶

Critical and postmodern hegelianisms in IR

A third broad area of contact with IR concerns critical, postcolonial, postmodern, and feminist scholarship, representing perhaps Hegel's largest and most diffuse influence



in the discipline. Here, influences are more methodological than substantive, drawing on Hegelian critical and dialectical tools of social and historical analysis. Critical theorists deploy Hegelian dialectics to explain conflict between classes, ethnicities and others, and to explain how communal and hybrid identities are created and transformed through contentious interactions with others. Many of these scholars might disagree with Hegel's substantive claims about the role of the state and the nature of war — instead, they advocate a critical, dialectical method. There is no one school here; rather, there are many, and thus many and varied Hegels as well. To the extent that critical theory in IR bears the influence of Marx, it exhibits Marx's Hegelian roots (e.g., Wallerstein 1979; Cox 1986). Scholars who draw on post-colonial theory in IR (Barkawi and Laffey 2006) have Hegelian roots by way of Marx, but also via anti-imperial theorists like Fanon (1967), and by way of French poststructuralists, who were in turn influenced by Hegel especially as interpreted by Kojève (1969). This influence is also present in IR postmodernists like Ashley (1987) and Der Derian (1992). The Frankfurt School critical theory, sometimes influenced by Hegel (Honneth 1996), has also exerted a recent influence in IR (Levine 2012). Similar connections might be drawn to IR feminists — most explicitly and directly in Hutchings (2003, 2005).⁷ These scholars deal with Hegel's perhaps most difficult element: his theoretical methodology. However, in so doing, they tend to elide his conclusions about world politics.

Normative Hegelianisms and the English School

The final body of IR literature on Hegel comes from normative international political theory. Such accounts often have links to the English School. For example, Bull (1976: 104, 247; 1977: 25) and Wight (1960: 37) find in Hegel a variant of Hobbesian or Machiavellian realism (see also Vincent 1983). While not detailed, such accounts locate Hegel in the tripartite English School framework of international orders based on realism, liberalism, and international society. Related normative accounts tend to be more in depth. Brown (1993: 60–71) rejects a strictly realist reading, and links Hegel instead to a normative communitarianism, in contrast to Kantian cosmopolitanism. Brown finds in Hegel neither strict liberalism nor realism, but instead an international order linked by 'thick' social ties. The most in-depth normative account in IR is that of Frost (1986, 1996), who draws on Hegelian international community as a basis for institutionally or culturally situated human rights. By locating the foundations of liberal rights inside a community, he leverages a liberal order out of a communitarian one. These accounts make serious attempts to engage Hegel as a moral philosopher — something he often was. However, in so doing, they elide Hegel's explanatory insights into world politics, particularly those concerning war and state formation and consolidation.



Realist constructivist hegelianism

While constructivists emphasise ideas and identity in international politics, only a few (Wendt 2003: 493; Jackson 2004) have addressed themselves directly to Hegel's account of international politics. This is surprising, since Hegel's strongest parallels in mainstream IR theory exist among constructivists.

Wendt (1992, 1999), like Hegel, suggests that states acquire identities and interests relationally, by interacting with their peers. Over time, states develop expectations and identities based on interactions, creating and re-creating the international system they constitute. For many constructivists, the consequences are tacitly pacific or liberal. Thus, Wendt suggests realist mistrust need not follow from the structure of anarchy: 'if states find themselves in a self-help system, this is because their practices made it that way' (Wendt 1992: 407). A spectrum of relations is possible, from peace and cooperation to conflict, depending on how states choose to relate to one another. It is these recurring behaviours that reify international structures. Since states presumptively prefer peaceful to conflictual relations, they will likely pursue more peaceful forms of interaction (Wendt 1999: 311–12).

Hegel also describes an international order that states themselves create. However, he argues that, additionally, states face imperatives to resolve domestic iniquities and to reinforce domestic social unity. Armed conflict presents opportunities to do both. States thus have a domestic (rather than systemic) incentive to pursue a conflictual international order, in which state identities may contend violently for recognition and domination.⁸ Mertens (1995: 671) glosses the argument usefully: 'Hegel holds that a society can only be an ethical community because of its relation to other communities and therefore because of the possibility of war. Without the possibility of struggle an ethical community would not exist. The complete absence of war is undesirable'. Hegel thus inverts the prevailing constructivist tendency towards liberalism. For Hegel, states will likely prefer an international structure in which they retain a free hand to reap the advantages of war. For both, anarchy involves uncertainty. For liberal constructivists, nonetheless, it bends towards peace. For Hegel, it bends towards war.

Hegel is thus closer to a realist constructivist account of international relations. In his systematic treatment, Barkin (2003, 2010) argues that a series of affinities between realism and constructivism offer the opportunity for joint theory building across the two schools 'that constructivist research is as compatible with a realist worldview as with any other' (Barkin 2003: 326). On this account, power shapes and constrains the impact of ideas on politics. However, ideas also shape power politics, since ideas impact perceived interests, and can be used to shape political outcomes:

[R]ealist constructivism would look at the way in which power structures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in



which a particular set of norms affect power structures [...]. The role of a realist constructivism, then, is to examine [...] the interrelationships between power and international norms. (Barkin 2003: 337)

In short, realist constructivism addresses how power and ideas are mutually constitutive. In theorising core matters of world politics, a realist constructivist account addresses how ideas help to shape power-political outcomes (war and peace), but also how power constrains the content and distribution of ideas (hegemonic states may thus shape the norms of the international system).

Barkin does not develop a precise definition or systematic explanatory theory of realist constructivism, opting instead for a detailed analysis of the points of contact between the two constituent schools. This may be due to his stated aversion to 'paradigm building' (Barkin 2010: 8). He thus prepares theoretical groundwork for realist constructivist explanations, but provides no systematic explanation of his own.⁹ While intellectually productive, this approach also has disadvantages. As several critics have noted in varying ways (Bially Mattern 2004; Jackson and Nexon 2004; Sterling-Folker 2004), the precise relationship between ideas and power remains underspecified.¹⁰ However, Barkin's approach also offers significant theoretical opportunities for building explanatory tools at the nexus of realist and constructivist reasoning. Building such substantive theoretical tools may help to better specify the power-ideas nexus. Other scholars have begun to contribute broadly realist constructivist explanatory theories of world politics. For example, Mitzen's (2006) account of 'ontological security' locates the causes of war in the creation and maintenance of state identity. Psychological social identity accounts link power-political dynamics to the self/other distinction between in-groups and out-groups (Tajfel 1974; Mercer 1995). Where Barkin has aimed at establishing a space for theorising, others have aimed to deploy a constructivist emphasis on ideas to rehabilitate classical realism generally (Williams 2005), or to draw new insights from early realist thinkers (see Sylvest 2010 on Herz; Solomon 2012 on Morgenthau).¹¹ These scholars emphasise ideational aspects of classical realism, implying links to constructivism or drawing them explicitly. They also indicate that rereading past theorists in new light offers fruitful theory-building opportunities. However, few of the accounts just surveyed develop programmatic explanatory theories. None are explicitly realist constructivist in Barkin's terms, and none link their projects explicitly to Hegel.

We contend that Hegel offers tools for building a more programmatic realist constructivism. Hegel accounts for the causes of war with reference to interactions between ideas and power. These interactions are focused on the struggle for recognition: the dialectical contention between actors through which identities are produced. The interactions of identity and interest bring about armed conflict. Hegel thus provides a coherent theoretical point of entry to articulating an applied realist constructivist theoretical synthesis.



Hegel on identity, the state, and war

This section expounds the Hegelian account, which links armed conflict to state formation and consolidation, thus connecting Hegel to realist constructivism. We begin by briefly setting out Hegel's account of the mutual constitution of self and other, found chiefly in his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1967). We then turn to his *Philosophy of Right* (1967), to address his account of state formation, and the state's institutional and social-structural imperfections ('contingencies'). For Hegel, these provide an occasion for nationalistic warfare and imperial expansion.

Self and other

Hegel's account of identity relies on a mutually constitutive relationship between self and other. While elements of it are found throughout his work, its most canonical form occurs in an early passage in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, on 'Lordship and Bondage' (Hegel 1967: 228–40), which is commonly taken as a point of departure for his account of identity.¹² For Hegel, identity or self-consciousness is predicated on recognition by others: 'it is only by being acknowledged or "recognized"' (Hegel 1967: 229). Hegel, like Hobbes and Locke, begins with individuals in a state of nature.¹³ However, Hegel is concerned not just with the emergence of social order out of the state of nature, but with explaining the emergence of the psychologically complete individual identity, and eventually collective identities as well.

In Hegel's account, two individuals encounter each other in the state of nature. Each recognises the other, and sees the other do the same: 'They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another' (Hegel 1967: 231). Each is the other to the other's self, and knows this. However, recognition between the two is limited in two ways. First, recognition is negative, defining the self only by exclusion: one knows oneself only as the entity that is not the other. Second, the other represents a potential physical threat. Each is thus motivated to both assert himself and his identity against the other, and to defend himself. Thus, 'they prove themselves and one another in a life-and-death struggle' (Hegel 1967: 232). By asserting themselves through violence, each both posits an identity against the other and protects that identity from physical destruction. In principle, this contention must be a 'trial by death' (Hegel 1967: 233), in which each attempts to assert itself absolutely. However, the death of the other would deprive the self of recognition by another. Thus, the victor in the struggle is, in the end, motivated not to kill his defeated enemy, but instead to submit him to servitude: 'The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter is the Bondsman' (Hegel 1967: 234).

In the new *status quo*, the two are socially linked to one another, and the possibility for recognition is preserved, but the two are sharply unequal. Since one dominates the other, lord and bondsman experience self-consciousness differently. The lord believes that he exists for himself, and that the bondsman exists to serve



him. Initially, the bondsman agrees: since he must do as he is told, his will is bound to that of his lord. This unequal relationship, however, has curious consequences:

[F]or recognition proper there is needed the moment that what the master does to the other he should also do to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself, he should do to the other also. On that account a form of recognition has arisen that is one sided and unequal. (Hegel 1967: 236)

This imbalance of recognition makes both identities incomplete. Having won, the lord has no more impetus to dwell on identity or self. Moreover, his relationship to the world around him — his possessions and his worldly goals — is mediated, since his work is deputised to his inferior. Inversely, the bondsman is made to dwell on identity, precisely because he is so sharply exposed to that of the lord. This experience of alienation drives a process of self-discovery and self-assertion: ‘Through work and labour [...] this consciousness of the bondsman comes to itself’ (Hegel 1967: 238). By doing the work of another, the bondsman comes to recognise both his own distinctive identity and his own capacities: ‘precisely in labour [...] the bondsman becomes aware, through this re-discovery of himself by himself of having a being and a “mind of his own”’ (Hegel 1967: 239).¹⁴ Through work, the bondsman becomes better equipped than is his superior, in terms of both physical capacity and identity consolidation. The result, implicitly, is a revolutionary situation: the lord faces overthrow. At a philosophical level, this takes the form of a dialectical inversion, with bondsman supplanting lord. Their positions are reversed and altered: both have now experienced both roles, and the roles themselves are transformed. Each ‘self’ gains new awareness of himself and his place in the world.

This process of dialectical inversion and alteration is iterated. Since neither individual is wholly satisfied by the outcome, further contentions ensue, across new and different oppositions. ‘Lordship and Bondage’ itself represents only an initial phase in the larger Hegelian system, out of which both individual psychology and the broader structures of social order emerge dialectically. In time, successive concatenating dialectical contentions between individuals will give rise to trade, contending coalitions, social classes, and the social and political order of the state.

State formation

The micro-level dialectical process at the heart of this individual-level contention thus becomes the theoretical engine that generates the social and political processes of history, among them state formation. For Hegel, as for Hobbes (1994) as well as other social contract theorists, the state originates as a response to a violent state of nature (Brooks 2007: 117). Hegel differs, however, in historicising the process of state emergence. The state emerges gradually through two processes, one micro-level and the other macro, that operate in dialogue. Social aggregation occurs both from the bottom up, through interactions between individuals, as well as from the top



down, being imposed by those possessing power. The modern state that eventually emerges — the *Philosophy of Right* emphasises the institutionalised nation-states of the 19th century Europe — is the largest and most institutionally robust political order Hegel deems possible.

At the micro level, individuals recognise and assert rights against one another through possession of property. Individuals, being in possession of different goods and abilities, engage in contract and exchange. In so doing, they recognise one another's existence and rights to property, and thus establish basic social dynamics (§217–218). Gradually, these acts of intersubjective engagement contribute further to transcending the state of nature, as political order consolidates and individual identities become group ones.

At the macro level, the power and legitimate authority of the state formalise and enforce order on a large scale. Like Hobbes, Hegel identifies a powerful actor — a monarch or sovereign — who subordinates others coercively, creating a state apparatus. This sovereign takes a 'formless mass' of people, governed by market self-interest, and unites it under one idea or personality of statehood (§289). Once the state is established, collective identity is inculcated through national education systems and religion, further unifying the population (§270). This two-track process is gradual and dialectical. The relationship between the individual and the state emerges over centuries, comprising the long arc of world history (§302–360).¹⁵

The state that eventually emerges is a unified social order, shaped by the interdependence of its constituent parts, including families, markets, classes, and organisations of civil society (§259). The state balances the competing interests of social subgroups and institutions. The administration of this balance demands not just sovereign authority, but also an appropriately structured government, what Hegel terms a 'division of powers' to 'guarantee public freedom' (§273): 'the power of the crown [...] otherwise might seem a mere arbitrary tyranny' (§302). In return for security, order, and welfare, the constituent components of the social order grant the state — the sovereign — legitimacy. The Hegelian state is thus neither the exclusively top-down product of coercion associated with Hobbes (1994), nor the bottom-up product of property rights assertions described (for example) by Locke (1963). Rather, both processes unfold over time, interacting dialectically to produce not just the coercive political power of the state, but also its domestic institutional structures, rights, and social order.¹⁶

In sum, the interactions of individuals, and later of smaller, less formally ordered social groups, give way to a bureaucratically ordered, socially just, and economically equitable whole: the modern state. Because it is the most just possible social order ('the actuality of the ethical Idea' [§257]), it realises the full potential of human society, as the largest and most integrated form of social organisation possible ('a self dependent organism' [§259]). The state satisfies the ethical needs of its citizens without need or possibility of integration at the international level.



Contingency

While Hegel views the modern state as the best possible form of social organisation, it nonetheless leaves ‘contingencies’, social iniquities or injustices, unaddressed by the institutional structure of the state. Chief among these are socio-economic issues.¹⁷ It is in these that we find the domestic roots of armed conflict.

Market economies, while efficient, will not provide for everyone reliably; Hegel posits that some part of the population will likely be impoverished by the vicissitudes of competition. Civil society alone cannot prevent or eliminate poverty through private charity and the like, as it lacks the resources to offer sufficient relief (§244 addition, §245), and the institutions of the state itself cannot do so without producing a permanent underclass of dependents (§245). Charity and welfare serve to mitigate contingencies, not to eliminate them. This is significant for Hegel, who regards economic contingencies as unjust and unsustainable: ‘once society is established, poverty immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class by another’ (§244 addition). Moreover, even when market exchange enriches both parties, it drives individualistic atomisation, raising self-interest over fellow feeling (§229 addition, §236, §236 addition).

Left unaddressed, economic contingencies threaten the social order. Prefiguring Marx, Hegel sees in the lower classes a group that might unify, forming ‘a rabble of paupers’, and rebel (§302). This undermines both the material stability and social cohesion of the state. Unlike Marx, however, Hegel views threats to the *status quo* as dangerous: the state is the bulwark between the social order and the state of nature, and must be preserved. Contingencies must thus be mitigated or eliminated in order to preserve sociopolitical stability.

Nationalistic war

Hegel’s solution involves nationalistic warfare. Contingencies can be externalised by the state through organised violence. Faced with a foreign threat, atomised individuals resolve into a coherent, nationalistic whole. This serves to unify the constituent components of the state in the face of delegitimising and destabilising internal contingencies.

Like contemporary realists, Hegel views conflict as a chronic feature of the international system. However, for Hegel, the structural pressure of anarchy alone does not create international violence. A balance of power between states and international law may both mitigate the threat of war.¹⁸ Why then, given the high costs of war, are states so often drawn into violent conflict? Hegel rejects ‘absolute evil’, ‘external accident’ (chance), or ‘the passions of powerful individuals or nations’ (§324) as insufficient or vague explanations. Rather, war is necessary for state building and consolidation.

In the face of widespread social and economic contingencies, national unity (‘political sentiment’ [§267]) requires cultivation. As between individuals, state



identity is attained through contention (§259 addition, §323). The state coheres through interactions with other states in what we would now call anarchy (§279, §322). Since struggles for recognition involve violence, armed conflict is a likely outcome. Indeed, war serves to consolidate identity: ‘As a result of war, nations are strengthened’ (§324, addition).¹⁹ As Gordon summarises,

War brings the irreducibility of social and collective dimensions of human freedom to the fore [...]. [I]t is about sacrificing the ‘external goods’ the state provides, in order to protect the irreducibly collective good internal to it — authentic human freedom. Thus war is a decisive moment in the ethical life of a community. (Gordon 2000: 313–14)

The sublimation of the individual into the objective whole of the state, and the collective identity of the nation, is the true, mature form of human courage: ‘readiness for sacrifice in the service of the state, so that the individual counts as only one among many’ (§327 addition). War forces diverse interest groups, factions, and classes within the state to cooperate. Indeed, the material harms of war are insignificant next to the gains in national unity facilitated (§324 addition). War remediates real and perceived inequities, driving the restless and self-interested individual back into the arms of the state: ‘peoples involved in civil strife [...] acquire peace at home through making wars abroad’ (§324 addition). War also mitigates the fragmenting effects of individualised liberal-capitalist life. According to Hegel (§324), ‘successful wars have checked domestic unrest and consolidated the power of the state at home’.²⁰

Moreover, the experience of war can be socially reproduced. War stories can be told and retold, allowing tellers to relive the experience and listeners to share in it, binding people together not only across space, in opposition to a common external enemy, but also across time. States made more cohesive by war are likely to fight more effectively in the future (§327 addition). War replaces the fragmenting effects of contingency with a positive feedback loop: individual self-actualisation through the state improves state performance in war, which in turn improves individual self-actualisation and loyalty to the state.²¹

Empire

Imperial expansion and colonial settlement provide an ideal vehicle for nationalistic warfare. Nations that expand ‘acquire peace at home through making wars abroad’ (§324 addition). Further, imperialism helps resolve economic contingencies, by providing employment, new markets, and greater resources. Because ‘civil society is not rich enough [...] to check excessive poverty’ (§245), it is motivated to seek foreign export markets (§246). Prefiguring Hobson (2010), Lenin (1948) and Snyder (1991), Hegel argues that the most useful markets are captive ones: ‘Civil society is thus driven to found colonies’ (§248 addition). Expansionist war both permits the



resolution of the state's contingencies, relieving pressures on civil society, and permits the state to create the highest attainable degree of idealised self-consciousness.²²

The result of such wars is the formation of a new society, and often a struggle for independence from the founding state. Hegel celebrates this outcome: it produces a new self-realised state, with a new national identity, of clear benefit to settlers. However, it is also good for the colonial power, 'just as the emancipation of slaves turns out to the greatest advantage of the owners'. The founding country is relieved of the burden of maintaining the colony, and can go about creating further colonies to address domestic contingencies. The pattern repeats itself: the expansionist economic needs of civil society dovetail with the need of the state to engage in warfare, to maximise the unity and shared consciousness of its population — and, in the end, with the needs of the colonial population, which becomes the founding population of a new state, itself thus geared to maximally benefit from war (§248 addition).

Indeed, in some respects, empire benefits not just the occupier, but also the occupied.²³ It may be through violent struggles for recognition that larger, more systematically integrated, more fully self-conscious social orders are created, culminating in the legal, bureaucratic order of statehood. 'A nation does not begin by being a state. The transition from a family, a horde, a clan, a multitude, &c., to political conditions [*i.e.* the institutions of the state]' is made possible through the collective struggle against occupation or oppression (§349). This struggle hardens the resolve and unity of an occupied people, readying them for sovereignty: 'peoples unwilling or afraid to tolerate sovereignty at home have been subjugated from abroad, and they have struggled for their independence' (§324). Thus — *contra* pacific liberalism — war may sometimes benefit both winners and losers alike.²⁴

Summing up

Hegel's account may be distilled to the following. States arise from a historical process as the largest and most politically desirable social units. However, the internal socioeconomic dynamics of states are often imperfect — market economies give rise to economic injustices, and national unity atrophies in the face of market individualism. States must thus provide economic relief and cultivate nationalism. War provides an opportunity for both. War is a powerful social motivator, at both individual and state levels. It diverts attention from domestic problems. It mobilises people in defence of life and property. Moreover, wars require central coordination (both helping to create and to legitimate the state apparatus). *Contra* Kantian cosmopolitanism (Kant 2008: 93-130), peace can be a cause of social stagnation — a problem that war remediates.²⁵



Hegel and realist constructivism

So understood, Hegel's account of war is broadly consistent with both realism and constructivism, as Barkin (2003) assesses them. First, it grants a central role to power in shaping international politics. Second, it insists on a role for ideas and identities. Third, it shows how ideas and identities shape those power-political dynamics, and are in turn shaped by them. It links these interactions to a recurring generative mechanism of social life: the dialectical struggle for recognition and identity consolidation, both between individuals and between groups.

Why then have constructivists not taken up Hegelian thought more systematically? The technical challenges of reading Hegelian theory aside, a likely explanation is that most early constructivist theory, and much that followed, is broadly liberal. This section shows how Hegelian thought can be brought to bear on a jointly realist and constructivist IR theory. Hegel's story begins with the mutual constitution of individual identities. This core methodological gambit — that identity is derived through interaction, and is thus irreducibly social in nature — is consistent with most constructivism. For Hegel, however, this interaction is almost necessarily conflictual.²⁶ Actors (individual, and later corporate) assert themselves against one another, contending for both the material resources of self-advancement and the psychological resources of identity consolidation. Conflict and competition over power and identity thus drive one another.

Liberal constructivists, as well as those who see anarchy as wholly 'what states make of it' (Wendt 1992), may criticise Hegel for harbouring residual structural determinism. Indeed, similar claims have been levelled against Barkin's project (Jackson and Nexon 2004: 339). However, Hegel offers a response. The beliefs and actions of individuals and states alike do indeed create social structures. However, the *process* by which this occurs is itself conflictual. Present politics are shaped by the dialectical contentions of the past. Current social conditions are produced by previous social conflicts and their outcomes. These contentions produce the modern state. However, they are also necessarily ongoing, since the bonds of nationhood must be both produced and reproduced, over and over again. Put differently, at the international level, current and former processes alike are constrained by power politics — politics specific to the process of state emergence. The process of creating and recreating the state imposes constraints on future political order.

However, for realist constructivists and for Hegel, war is not simply diversionary (Smith 1996; Tarar 2006), nor does it merely foment a rally-round-the-flag effect (Baker and Oneal 2001; Baum 2002). In such accounts, individual leaders may derive short-term advantage from military adventurism. For Hegel, national identity itself derives from the solidarity-building effects of past and future wars. Diversionary theories expect occasional wars, matched with short-term increases in nationalist sentiments. For Hegel, war is not a temporary distraction. It builds identity over the long haul, not just at the elite level, but also at the level of mass politics.²⁷



As for most constructivists, ideas and practices generate stable patterns of interaction, and are often difficult to change once reified (cf. Risse-Kappen 1994; Wendt 1999). For Hegel, as we have seen, internally unified, well-ordered states are likely to be internationally violent, insofar as violence is necessary to make them cohere. Once the modern state has been built, there is a trade-off between internal integration and development, and external peace: the more a state pursues the former, the less likely will be the latter. States may make the ‘content’ of anarchy, but the already constituted power- and identity-laden dynamic of domestic politics will impel them to make anarchy belligerent rather than cosmopolitan.

Hegel’s account owes famously much to Hobbes (1994), but differs in important ways as well. For Hobbes, the state of nature was, at least theoretically, overcome once-and-for-all by the creation of the state. This is a process driven chiefly by material self-interest, in the form of individual survival in the state of nature. For Hegel, the state and national identity emerge gradually and contentiously out of a dialectical struggle for recognition — both individual and collective — that drives the process of history. The Hobbesian story produces state institutions. The Hegelian one produces both institutions and identities.²⁸ It is in this sense that Hegel is not a strict realist (Brooks 2004), but is instead a constructivist one.

Thus, Hegel prefigures both Wendt’s (1999) account of the power of ideas and identities to shape the international system, and Waltz’s (1979) and other realists’ belief in the anarchical system’s propensity to replicate itself. Having arrived historically at a system of sovereign states in anarchy, we can expect this order to persist. Indeed, it is identities, as much as or even more than structural constraints, that drive this propensity. States may rise and fall, but the structure is durable and resistant to change. Hegel’s additional insight, a broadly constructivist one, is that these wars not only shape the balance of power under the structure of anarchy, but also reinforce the identities of the states involved as the coherent and nationally unified polities they strive to be.

Hegel and his critics

Hegel makes a stark claim: the state can consolidate and perpetuate itself, socially, economically, and institutionally, through organised violence projected abroad. It is perhaps not surprising then that he has been subjected to many and varied criticisms. This section addresses briefly four possible shortcomings of the Hegelian account of war, and argues that it remains theoretically tenable on a realist constructivist reading.²⁹

First, as democratic peace theorists observe, the second half of the 20th century has seen a substantial reduction in the occurrence and intensity of inter-state warfare.³⁰ The postwar peace cuts sharply against the Hegelian claim that states must assert their political and cultural independence violently in order to self-actualise fully as



ideal social institutions. Indeed, for some democratic peace theorists, the peace has deep cultural or sociological roots (Kahl 1998; Williams 2001), suggesting an inversion of Hegel's argument. Alternately, it may be linked to a broader, macro-historical decline in violence (Pinker 2011). That nation-states have persisted and indeed proliferated during this period, in spite of not routinely going to war, suggests that Hegel may have overstated the role of armed violence in state creation and maintenance.

Second, and related, the rise of international institutions and security communities appears to undermine the Hegelian argument against integration beyond the level of the state. While IR theorists can and do dispute the efficacy of the UN and many other intergovernmental organisations, the EU presents a significant case of agglomeration above the level of the sovereign state (Moravcsik 2002). It also presents a case of persistent regional peace in precisely the region where Hegel claims war has had a substantially creative effect. Hegel does 'refer to the European peoples as a "family"' (Jaeger 2002: 503). However, he does not prescribe or project substantial transnational integration.

Third, the decline in inter-state war has been accompanied by an increase in intra-state warfare, and more recently by the rise of various violent non-state actors, such as insurgents, terrorists, and transnational criminal networks. Hegel makes little reference to these, acknowledging violent non-state actors only in arguing that, since they lack the domestic political balance and unity of the state, they are comparatively disadvantaged in armed conflict (§327 addition). Setting aside his remarks about anti-imperial revolution (§248 addition, §324), he offers little direct account of insurgency, civil war, state failure, and the like.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Hegel makes little allowance for the extremely destructive power of modern warfare (Brooks 2007: 128). Hegel wrote before the mechanisation of European wars, and long before nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, accounts of warfare as destroyer of nations are as old as Thucydides (1978). Given the wars of the 20th century, this gap is especially stark. Much as there may be benefits from war, attendant losses have expanded vastly since Hegel wrote.

These matters amount to concerns about the scope and boundaries of Hegel's explanatory theoretical account. However, being a political philosopher and not a social scientist, Hegel did not address these matters in these terms. Thus, for example, he does not offer us a precise formulation of when we should and should not expect the struggle for recognition in the international system to give rise to violence, and when not. More generally, his theoretical framework does not offer predictions.³¹ We might think of the analytical tools he offers as ideal types — simplified explanations after the fact. So understood, these tools tell us about how war comes about when it does. Hegel's theoretical shortcomings are not to be ignored, but when assessed on their own terms they often have Hegelian solutions.

First, it is possible that the decline of inter-state war has indeed had the type of negative effects that Hegel would expect. This reduction has perhaps prevented the



self-actualisation of states, especially newly formed post-colonial states, which are deprived of the consolidating effects of war by the protections of international law. Wracked by internal divisions along ethnic, class, confessional, or ideological lines, their internal conflicts often attest to these weaknesses. Alternately, the continued involvement of developed Western states, couched as assistance rather than domination, may hamper the emergence of viable nation-states.

Second, the rise of robust institutionalisation on Hegel's native continent does appear to suggest that institutions can eliminate great power warfare from a historically violent region, at least in the medium term. However, the recent political and economic instability of the EU suggests that the peaceful postwar bargain is somewhat less stable than has sometimes been assumed. Moreover, the failure of a unified European identity to emerge at the level of popular, mass politics suggests that European integration lacks the 'thick' quality required by Hegelian national identity in a unified state.³²

Third, the relative dearth of inter-state wars in the post-colonial period may itself have given rise to intra-state and non-state violence. If weak postcolonial states were not protected by the institutional framework of international law, these states might simply be reabsorbed into larger imperial projects, as Hegel suggests. Indeed, it is often in failed states that violent non-state actors flourish. A Hegelian account suggests that imperial re-expansion into these territories would likely be followed by anti-imperial resistance, and eventual more robust statehood. Anti-colonial resentment and revolutionary violence would help to consolidate the nation, while freeing it to build a state.³³

Lastly, the destructive power of mechanised and nuclear war is less easily addressed in the Hegelian account (Boucher 1998: 347). The conflicts he describes, those he knew empirically, were not the all-consuming wars-to-end-all-wars of the first half of the 20th century. Rather, Hegel's wars are smaller affairs, 'humanely waged', the effects of which are regulative rather than destructive (§338 addition). They build and sustain states in anarchy.³⁴ Hegel's position seems difficult to defend after the violence of the 20th century. One might note only that, given the capacity of these conflicts to destroy nations completely, or nearly so, Hegel provides an account not of the costs of nuclear war, but the sociopolitical cost of nuclear peace. Where great powers can no longer make war against one another, they lose an important vehicle for their own advancement and collective identity construction.³⁵

These Hegelian responses are broadly consistent with a realist constructivism. While the decline of inter-state war may result from changes in the ideational content of anarchy, it also has power-political consequences within the state. The failure of a pan-European identity to emerge suggests residual competition in Europe at the level of ideas and identities — identities that can spill over into European politics, as in the case of perceived differences between Northern and Southern Europe in the recent economic crisis. The potential for imperial expansion into weak states suggests a potential for persistent resurgent identities and ideologies linked to imperialism, and



thus to expansionist power politics. Finally, Hegel allows realist constructivism to consider theoretically the costs of the loss of war as an identity-making device.³⁶

Conclusion

As we observed at this article's outset, Hegel remains relatively underread in IR. In an effort to make Hegelian thought more accessible to IR theory, we have linked Hegel's account of international politics to the realist constructivist project. Hegel's account of identity formation and interaction is linked to the struggle for recognition, and thus to the possibility of armed conflict. In this reading, war can be understood as a necessary consequence of complete integration within the state itself. In order to consolidate social unity and economic wellbeing domestically, states must have a free hand to engage in combative behaviour internationally. As states work to consolidate their internal identities in the face of domestic contingencies, and contend with one another to assert their identities internationally, war and imperial expansion likely result.

Hegel's framework offers an opportunity to clarify and apply the tenets of realist constructivism. It is broadly consistent with a decidedly realist approach to the social construction of international politics, insofar as it emphasises realist power politics, the role of ideas, and the interactions between the two. In so doing, it provides tools for thinking critically about the role of ideas in world politics, without neglecting the role of power in shaping ideas. For Hegel, power politics and the politics of ideas are not mutually exclusive. More accurately, they are inseparable — the logic of the struggle for recognition, and thus of identity consolidation, makes this so.

While this article has necessarily been theoretical and somewhat provisional, we offer a few words on the analytical utility of this account for empirical research. Hegel links international armed conflict to domestic politics, and specifically to national identity consolidation through the struggle for recognition. This suggests affinities not just with conventional inter-state war, but also with other areas of security studies, especially as regards the global South. For example, the often-violent pro-independence movements that drove the 20th century decolonisation suggest an affinity with the Hegelian struggle for national identity and sovereignty. We might, therefore, expect postcolonial states to be strongest where that struggle was most effective in consolidating a nation within a newly independent territory.³⁷ Similar dynamics attended the fall of communism, to which constructivists (Wendt 1992; Risse-Kappen 1994) and Hegelians (Fukuyama 1993) alike have paid particular attention. Specifically, in the sudden ideological vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the states most prone to internecine violence were those with contending nationalisms, for example the former Yugoslavia and the South Caucasus. In these cases, various groups struggled against one another not just for sovereignty, but also for recognition *as* nations. There may be further parallels in the events of the Arab Spring, where the successful overthrow of several governments



has rarely led to the national consolidation described by Hegel. Where national identities were already strong, stable states persist. Where not, fragmentation has occurred, as state institutions break down without a nation to grant them social coherence.³⁸ Since these struggles were internal, rather than against a foreign occupier, they did little to consolidate national identities. These suggestions are necessarily brief and preliminary, but should indicate the scope of potential inquiry — not least because they imply parallels with the existing research in these areas.

We close by focusing on two problems that Hegel's account of war and state building raises. The first is the problem anachronism. This difficulty faces any IR-theoretical reading of Hegel, or indeed of other canonical political theorists. Transposing Hegelian thought into the context of modern social science necessarily does violence both to his theoretical assumptions and to his intentions, both of which belong to the early 19th century Prussia, rather than to the present. A realist constructivist approach thus faces real barriers to interpretation, but nonetheless has tools with which to address them self-consciously. Realism shares with Hegel his core substantive insight about the nature of world politics — the inevitability of conflict. Constructivism and Hegelianism share an emphasis on the role of ideas in driving historical process, and therefore on intellectual history. It should not surprise us then that realist constructivism shares core substantive and methodological assumptions with Hegel, about both the role of power in the history of ideas and the role of ideas in the history of power.

However, a more practical issue is reading Hegel as a social scientist, something he clearly was not. Indeed, Hegel's philosophy extended beyond explaining socio-political phenomena, to providing ethical analysis and metaphysical foundations. Moreover, Hegel makes no predictive claims. Nonetheless, the substantive affinities between Hegel's account of war and state formation and realist constructivism documented above are significant. The problem can be understood as one of translation. Translations are never perfect, and generally involve some loss of meaning. Nevertheless, they can still be productive as, for example, use of Kantian ideas in explaining the democratic peace has been.³⁹ Borrowing from Kant has not occurred without loss of nuance, and has rightly driven extensive and necessary debates about how Kant should be read. Nonetheless, these theoretical appropriations have fed an extremely fruitful research programme.

A final set of problems, on which we conclude, are the account's ethical implications. On the one hand, Hegel suggests that the attainment of the state's ethical goals, and fulfilment of its obligations to its citizens, is tied up inextricably with international armed conflict. On the other hand, Hegelian critical tools have a long history of association with moral critique, much of it directed against power politics in defence of the subjugated, as the above review of critical IR Hegelianisms attests. There is thus a central tension here, between Hegel's critical methods and his substantive commitment to war — it seems especially sharp in, for example, his account of imperial expansion. As Barkin (2003: 337) observes, such tensions are paralleled by Carr's (1946: 210) insistence on persistent dialectical contention



between 'power and morality'. For Carr, this disagreement propelled international relations — both the field and its object of study. This suggests that the tension in Hegel may be insoluble, but nonetheless productive, insofar as it offers tools with which to understand, and thus critically assess, the social processes it documents.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Ryan Balot, Kiran Banerjee, Nancy Bertoldi, Alan Brudner, Jarrod Hayes, Rebecca Kingston, Jeffrey Kopstein, Christopher LaRoche, Mark Neufeld, Jonas Schwab Pflug, Simon Pratt, Janice Stein, the journal's editors, and three anonymous reviewers.

Notes

- 1 Hegel receives a fraction of the attention IR devotes to, for example, Kant or Marx. However, Hegel remains a major voice in political theory and elsewhere in social sciences and the humanities. A recent Google Scholar search produced more than half a million hits. IR research on Hegel includes Smith (1983), Knutsen (1992: 147–50), Linklater (1996), Boucher (1998: 330–53), Jaeger (2002), and Brooks (2004). For treatments of Hegelian international thought by political theorists, see Verene (1971), Smith (1983), Walt (1989), and Harris (1993), as well as reviews in Brown (1991) and Peperzak (1994). For general reviews see Houlgate (2005) and Brooks (2007).
- 2 Hegel's thought varied over the course of his career, perhaps accounting for the range of readings of his work. We emphasise the *Philosophy of Right*, and thus his later period, because it offers his most extensive and programmatic comments on international matters. All such references are to *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1967). Following the practice in political theory, we cite paragraph (section) rather than page numbers. 'Addition' indicates reference to notes appended to the work. We supplement this with an account of recognition and identity found in the *Phenomenology of Mind* (1967).
- 3 Our purpose is not to explicate Hegelian political thought in its totality. Hegel was not a social scientist — his work transcended contemporary disciplinary boundaries, offering political, sociological, psychological, moral, theological, aesthetic, and other insights. We emphasise only those portions useful to IR scholars. We discuss this below in addressing the problem of anachronism.
- 4 On Hegel's and other German liberalisms in IR, see Shilliam (2009).
- 5 While Kojève's idiosyncratic politics were not strictly liberal, he emphasises progress and freedom.
- 6 Alternately, Wendt's (2003) argument that 'a world state is inevitable' uses a quasi-Hegelian teleological argument to draw the non-Hegelian conclusion that, in the long term, global politics will trend towards unity.
- 7 See also Inayatullah and Blaney (2003) on 'the problem of difference'. For a review of critical, postmodern, postcolonial, and feminist IR Hegelianisms, see Hutchings (2003). For discussion of Hegel and Marx in IPE, see Inayatullah and Blaney (1997: 70–72).
- 8 Tilly's (1985: 170) account of the 'interdependence of war making and state making' also suggests that armed conflict is necessary for state formation. However, Tilly emphasises the role of war in the institutional development of the state. Hegel emphasises also its role in driving national unity.
- 9 A broadly parallel account by Glenn (2009) suggests the possibility of cross-pollination between realism and postmodern studies of strategic culture.
- 10 While Barkin's (2010) book-length account addresses some of these questions, a systematic realist-constructivist theory of international politics has yet to appear.
- 11 Alternatively, Steele (2007) has used constructivism to critique realism's traditional interlocutor, liberalism.



- 12 The most influential exposition of this passage is that of Kojève (1969: 45–60), whose reading we follow largely. The two figures are called alternately master and slave. Hegel uses masculine pronouns throughout, and we follow him in doing so.
- 13 Hegel was not strictly a social contract theorist, in the sense of articulating a single contract once and for all time, as did Hobbes and Locke. However, he does speak of a social contract with some regularity. For discussion see Brudner (2012: 187–89).
- 14 On labour and identity, see also *Philosophy of Right* (§194–198).
- 15 Hegel’s account of state formation is complex, nuanced, and perhaps inevitably subject to multiple readings. For points of entry see Avineri (1972), Brooks (2007), Wood (2011). For Hegel on Hobbes and Locke, see Smith (1989: 65–70). Hegel’s gradualisation of state emergence, and emphasis on contestation and contention, implies a critique of traditional social contract theory (Haddock 1994).
- 16 At his most systematic, Hegel traces this process across the arc of world history, from ancient ‘oriental’ civilisation, to Hellenic, Roman, and finally ‘Germanic’ or European civilisations. He understands this path as the process of the realisation of human freedom. Being concerned with warfare between modern states only, this article sets these broader historical nuances aside. Hegel’s most complete treatment is in his *Philosophy of History* (1956).
- 17 Hegel offers additional examples of contingency, many of which are more sociologically ‘thick’. In law, for example, ‘no absolute lines can be drawn’ in trials by jury on how jury members should determine truth. Thus, ‘subjective opinion enters’, and a contingent element of arbitrariness cannot be avoided (§234 addition). Public education produces contingencies as well, since ‘the line which demarcates the rights of parents from those of civil society is very hard to draw’ (§239 addition) on the question of what should be taught. In both cases, the best available state institutions fall short, and produce outcomes that endanger the state’s legitimacy.
- 18 Hegel recognises that international law often governs state-to-state interaction effectively: ‘treaties, as they involve the mutual obligations of states, must be kept’ (§333), and often are. Moreover, treaties are sites of recognition between states (§331). International law does not, however, preclude violence, since recognition through law alone is not sufficient to produce and reproduce the state. See also Hegel’s *Philosophy of History* (1956: 440–41).
- 19 Smith echoes this reading. ‘In times of war’, he argues, ‘common values and commitments are not only preserved but enhanced’ (1983: 628). War ‘transcends attachment to things by uniting men for the purpose of a common ideal’ (*ibid.*). War ‘reassert[s] the primacy of the state over and above the aggregate of private interests that constitutes civil society’ (*ibid.*: 625).
- 20 Even in Avineri’s (1972: 198) relatively liberal reading of Hegel, war draws people together, tearing down ‘walls created by ossified self-interest’.
- 21 Hegel makes a similar claim in his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1967: 474): ‘In order not to [...] let the common spirit evaporate, government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by War. By this means [...] the individuals [...] are made, by the task thus imposed upon them by government, to feel the power of their lord and master, death.’ By facing the fact of mortality together, individuals re-engage in the fellow feeling necessary for the state to persist. Thus, ‘[w]ar is the spirit and form in which the essential moment of ethical substance, the absolute freedom of ethical self-consciousness from all and every kind of existence, is manifestly confirmed and realized’ (*ibid.*: 497). The state is most complete and is most completely unified in the act of international armed violence.
- 22 Colonisation can be either sporadic, that is incidental, or systematic. The former is typified by German emigration outside of Central Europe — that is, by *ad hoc*, individual resettlement. The latter is typified by English or Spanish settlement in the new world. This more radical form of colonialism, of which Hegel very much approves, involves the wholesale settlement and occupation of a territory, which is converted to the ends of the settlers (§248 addition). On Hegel on empire, see Tyler (2004).
- 23 ‘The same consideration justifies civilized nations in regarding and treating as barbarians those who lag behind them [...]. Thus a pastoral people may treat hunters as barbarians, and both of these are



- barbarians from the point of view of agriculturalists, &c. The civilized nation is conscious that the rights of barbarians are unequal to its own and treats their autonomy as only a formality' (§351).
- 24 The effect is not, of course, universal. War cannot benefit a state it destroys. It may however harden those it does not, even when they lose, and may often benefit peoples, if not states, since war catalyses nationalism. This in turn lays groundwork for a struggle for recognition, revolution, and restored or newfound sovereignty.
- 25 In some respects, Hegel thus inverts the tragedy of realism: here, the dangerous logic of the security dilemma gives rise to potentially beneficial international violence. Rather than tragic and destructive, wars prove constructive for the political communities that wage them.
- 26 Admittedly, conflictual accounts of relations between self and other are not without their critics in IR — see Neumann (1996). For a general critique in political theory, see Abizadeh (2005).
- 27 On the limited effects of diversionary war, see Lian and Oneal (1993) and Meernik and Waterman (1996). Thus, any such effect would have to be broader and more diffuse.
- 28 Similarly, where for Hobbes the monarch ('sovereign') is head of state in a power-political sense, for Hegel the monarch is both a political leader and a symbol, a representative, of the nation in contentions over recognition internationally.
- 29 Our focus is on Hegel's positive theory, rather than ethical implications of his work, which is subject to a literature of its own. Some of Hegel's critics (Popper 1945) take the view that Hegel was a normative theorist, advocating war. Others (Brooks 2004, 2007) take the view that he merely describes a dynamic in the international political system, rather than advocating it. Since we are concerned with social scientific explanation, rather than normative theory, we take no position on the issue.
- 30 For points of entry to the democratic peace, see Doyle (1983), Owen (1994), Oneal and Russett (1999), Williams (2001), and Hayes (2009) for an extensive review.
- 31 This is reflected in his famous dictum that '[t]he owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk' (Hegel 1967: 23 [Preface]) — that is, that philosophy, here represented by Minerva (Athena of classical mythology), can begin its work only once events have ended. It can only explain the past, not predict the future.
- 32 Hegel might expect that, if the EU is a polity unto itself, it would consolidate its collective identity by fighting foreign wars. Its failure to do so may explain its failure to cause its people to 'feel' especially European.
- 33 See, for example, Herbst (1990) on the absence of war and state weakness in Africa, and Jackson (1990) on 'quasi-states'.
- 34 This suggests parallels with Schmitt (1996). However, *contra* Hegel, Schmitt viewed the increasing polarisation of modern war as dangerous. For analysis in IR, see Odysseos and Petito (2007).
- 35 Some have argued (Mertens 1995; Gordon 2000) that Hegel, like Kant, advocated limits on war, to mitigate its destructive power and lay groundwork for the peace to follow. He was thus a proponent of limited warfare: enough to consolidate the state internally, not enough to destroy it.
- 36 We have not directly addressed moral criticisms of Hegel's political thought (e.g. Popper 1945). Complaints that Hegel was morally presentist, simply endorsing the values of his time, date at least to Feuerbach (1966) and Marx (1988). Where Hegelian thought was once deeply associated with the early 19th century Prussian bureaucracy and militarism, more recent research suggests that such concerns are overdrawn (Houlgate 2011; Engelhardt and Pinkard 1994). Others have argued that the critical method, rather than the substance, of Hegel's thought provides a way to avoid a presentist bias (Buchwalter 1991).
- 37 However, one must bear in mind the stark racism of Hegel's treatment of non-European peoples — see especially *The Philosophy of History* (1956: 79–102).
- 38 Especially relevant here might be Hegel's discussion of the French Revolution in *The Philosophy of History* (1956: 438–57).
- 39 See note 30 above.



References

- Abizadeh, Arash (2005) 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity', *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 45–60.
- Ashley, Richard (1987) 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', *Alternatives* 12(4): 403–34.
- Avineri, Shlomo (1972) *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baker, William D. and John Oneal (2001) 'Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The Nature and Origins of the 'Rally 'Round the Flag' Effect', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(5): 661–87.
- Barkawi, Tarak and Mark Laffey (2006) 'The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies', *Review of International Studies* 32(2): 329–52.
- Barkin, J. Samuel (2003) 'Realist Constructivism', *International Studies Review* 5(3): 325–42.
- Barkin, J. Samuel (2010) *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baum, Matthew A. (2002) 'The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon', *International Studies Quarterly* 46(2): 263–98.
- Bially Mattern, Janice (2004) 'Power in Realist-Constructivist Research', *International Studies Review* 6(2): 343–46.
- Boucher, David (1998) *Political Theories of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brooks, Thom (2004) 'Hegel's Theory of International Politics: A Reply to Jaeger', *Review of International Studies* 30(1): 149–52.
- Brooks, Thom (2007) *Hegel's Political Philosophy*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Brown, Chris (1991) 'Hegel and International Ethics', *Ethics & International Affairs* 5(1): 73–86.
- Brown, Chris (1993) *New Normative Approaches*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brudner, Alan (2012) 'Hegel on the Relation between Law and Justice', in Thom Brooks, ed., *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, 180–208, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Buchwalter, Andrew (1991) 'Hegel, Marx, and the Concept of Immanent Critique', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29(2): 253–79.
- Bull, Hedley (1976) 'Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations', *British Journal of International Studies* 2(1): 101–16.
- Bull, Hedley (1977) *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Carr, Edward Hallett (1946) *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, New York: Harper and Row.
- Cox, Robert W. (1986) 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, 204–54, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Der Derian, James (1992) *Anti-Diplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War*, London: Blackwell.
- Doyle, Michael W. (1983) 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12(3): 205–35.
- Engelhardt, H. Tristram Jr. and Terry Pinkard, eds. (1994) *Hegel Reconsidered: Beyond Metaphysics and the Authoritarian State*, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Fanon, Frantz (1967) *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, New York: Grove Press.
- Feuerbach, Ludwig (1966) *Principle of the Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Manfred Vogel, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Frost, Mervyn (1986) *Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frost, Mervyn (1996) *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1993) *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Avon.
- Glenn, John (2009) 'Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?' *International Studies Review* 11(3): 523–51.



- Gordon, Rupert H. (2000) 'Modernity, Freedom, and the State: Hegel's Concept of Patriotism', *Review of Politics* 62(2): 295–325.
- Haddock, Bruce (1994) 'Hegel's Critique of the Theory of the Social Contract', in David Boucher and Paul Kelly, eds., *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls*, 149–64, London: Routledge.
- Harris, Errol E. (1993) 'Hegel's Theory of Sovereignty, International Relations, and War', in Lawrence S. Stepelevich, ed., *Selected Essays on G.W.F. Hegel*, 104–15, New Jersey: Humanities Press International.
- Hayes, Jarrod (2009) 'Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs', *International Studies Quarterly* 53(4): 977–99.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1956) *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, New York: Dover.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1967) *Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie, New York: Harper Torchbooks.
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1967) *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox, London: Oxford University Press.
- Herbst, Jeffrey (1990) 'War and the State in Africa', *International Security* 14(4): 117–39.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1994) in Edwin Curley, ed., *Leviathan*, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Hobson, John A. (2010) *Imperialism: A Study*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Honneth, Axel (1996) *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Joel Anderson, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Houlgate, Stephen (2005) *An Introduction to Hegel*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Houlgate, Stephen (2011) 'G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to his Life and Thought', in Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur, eds., *A Companion to Hegel*, 1–19, London: Blackwell.
- Hutchings, Kimberly (2003) *Hegel and Feminist Philosophy*, Oxford: Polity Press.
- Hutchings, Kimberly (2005) 'Speaking and Hearing: Habermasian Discourse Ethics, Feminism, and IR', *Review of International Studies* 31(1): 155–65.
- Inayatullah, Naeem and David L. Blaney (1997) 'Economic Anxiety: Reification, De-Reification, and the Politics of IPE', in Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denmark, eds., *Constituting International Political Economy*, 59–77, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
- Inayatullah, Naeem and David L. Blaney (2003) *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*, London: Routledge.
- Jackson, Robert H. (1990) *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus (2004) 'Hegel's House, or 'People Are States, Too'', *Review of International Studies* 30(2): 281–87.
- Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Daniel H. Nexon (2004) 'Constructivist Realism or Realist Constructivism?' *International Studies Review* 6(2): 337–41.
- Jaeger, Hans-Martin (2002) 'Hegel's Reluctant Realism and the Transnationalisation of Civil Society', *Review of International Studies* 28(3): 497–517.
- Kahl, Colin H. (1998) 'Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace', *Security Studies* 8(2–3): 94–144.
- Kant, Immanuel (2008) *Political Writings*, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Knutsen, Torbjørn L. (1992) *A History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kojève, Alexandre (1969) trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. in Allan Bloom, ed., *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Lenin, Vladimir I (1948) *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Levine, Daniel (2012) *Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Critique*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lian, Bradley and John R. Oneal (1993) 'Presidents, the Use of Force, and Public Opinion', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(2): 277–300.



- Linklater, Andrew (1996) 'Hegel, the State and International Relations', in Ian Clark and Iver Neumann, eds., *Classical Theories of International Relations*, 193–203, London: Macmillan.
- Locke, John (1963) 'Second Treatise', in Peter Laslett, ed., *Two Treatises of Government*, 299–477, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Marx, Karl (1988) *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. Martin Milligan Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Meernik, James and Peter Waterman (1996) 'The Myth of the Diversionsary Use of Force by American Presidents', *Political Research Quarterly* 49(3): 573–90.
- Mercer, Jonathan (1995) 'Anarchy and Identity', *International Organization* 49(2): 229–52.
- Mertens, Thomas (1995) 'Hegel's Homage to Kant's *Perpetual Peace*: An Analysis of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 321–340', *Review of Politics* 57(4): 665–91.
- Mitzen, Jennifer (2006) 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma', *European Journal of International Relations* 12(3): 341–70.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (2002) 'Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(4): 603–24.
- Neumann, Iver (1996) 'Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 2(2): 139–74.
- Odysseos, Louisa and Fabio Petito, eds (2007) *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War, and the Crisis of the Global Order*, London: Routledge.
- Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett (1999) 'The Kantian Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?' *World Politics* 52(1): 1–37.
- Owen, John M. (1994) 'How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace', *International Security* 19(2): 87–125.
- Peperzak, Adrian (1994) 'Hegel contra Hegel in His Philosophy of Right: The Contradictions of International Politics', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 32(2): 241–63.
- Pinker, Steven (2011) *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, New York: Viking.
- Popper, Karl (1945) *The Open Society and its Enemies*, London: Routledge.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1994) 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Politics, and the End of the Cold War', *International Organization* 48(2): 185–214.
- Schmitt, Carl (1996) *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shilliam, Robbie (2009) *German Thought and International Relations*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Smith, Alistair (1996) 'Diversionsary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems', *International Studies Quarterly* 40(1): 133–53.
- Smith, Steven B. (1983) 'Hegel's Views on War, the State, and International Relations', *American Political Science Review* 77(3): 624–32.
- Smith, Steven B. (1989) *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Snyder, Jack (1991) *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Solomon, Ty (2012) 'Human Nature and the Limits of the Self: Hans Morgenthau on Love and Power', *International Studies Review* 14(2): 201–24.
- Steele, Brent J. (2007) 'Liberal-Idealism: A Constructivist Critique', *International Studies Review* 9(1): 23–52.
- Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (2004) 'Realist Constructivism and Power', *International Studies Review* 6(2): 341–43.
- Sylvest, Casper (2010) 'Realism and International Law: The Challenge of John H. Herz', *International Theory* 2(3): 410–45.
- Tajfel, Henri (1974) 'Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior', *Social Science Information* 13(2): 65–93.
- Tarar, Ahmer (2006) 'Diversionsary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War', *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1): 169–88.



- Thucydides, (1978) *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. by Rex Warner Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Tilly, Charles (1985) 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*, 169–91, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tyler, Colin (2004) 'Hegel, War, and the Tragedy of Imperialism', *History of European Ideas* 30(4): 403–31.
- Verene, Donald P. (1971) 'Hegel's Account of War', in Z. A. Pelczynski, ed., *Hegel's Political Philosophy*, 168–80, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vincent, Andrew (1983) 'The Hegelian State and International Politics', *Review of International Studies* 9(3): 191–205.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979) *The Capitalist World Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walt, Steven (1989) 'Hegel on War: Another Look', *History of Political Thought* 10(1): 112–23.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Wendt, Alexander (1992) 'Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46(2): 391–425.
- Wendt, Alexander (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Wendt, Alexander (2003) 'Why a World State is Inevitable', *European Journal of International Relations* 9(4): 491–542.
- Wight, Martin (1960) 'Why is there no International Theory?' *International Relations* 2(1): 35–48.
- Williams, Michael C. (2001) 'The Discipline of the Democratic Peace: Kant, Liberalism and the Social Construction of Security Communities', *European Journal of International Relations* 7(4): 525–53.
- Williams, Michael C. (2005) *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, Allen W. (2011) 'Hegel's Political Philosophy', in Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur, eds., *A Companion to Hegel*, 297–311, London: Blackwell.

About the Authors

Joseph MacKay (b. 1980) is an incoming SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto and an LLM from the University of Kent. His research focuses on the history of non-state violence and state responses to it, and has appeared, or is forthcoming, in *International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, *Central Asian Survey*, and *Social Science History*, and with co-authors in *Terrorism & Political Violence*, *International Politics*, and *International Studies Review*.

Jamie Levin (b. 1977) is an incoming Azrieli Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Toronto and an MSc from the London School of Economics. His work focuses on conflict and conflict resolution and has been published in the *Palestine Israel Journal*, and with co-authors in the *Journal of Peace Conflict and Development*, *International Politics*, and *International Studies Review*.